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INTRODUCTION
r'1'E federal courts of New York are interpreting the precise scope of
1the Supreme Court's one-person, one-vote decisions as applied to
city elections.' The case has profound political implications for the gov-
ernance of New York City and other municipalities, and raises basic
questions concerning the nature of political representation. Immediately
at stake is the viability of an institution in New York City government
that has brought together the highest officials of the city and its boroughs
for over 110 years. This institution, known as the Board of Estimate
(Board), has functioned at times as the upper house of a bicameral legis-
lature,2 while at other times it has been viewed as a check on the excesses
of the city legislature.3 Its history has long reflected the changing power
relationships between the centralized city government and the five bor-
oughs. Currently, the Board is being challenged on the ground that its
membership and voting structure violate basic democratic principles em-
bodied in the fourteenth amendment.4 If the Board is dismembered, its
1. See infra notes 141-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the framework
of this litigation.
2. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
4. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
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significant functions could pass to the Mayor and the City Council, re-
sulting in a dramatic shift in the power structure of New York City
government.
New York City's Board of Estimate is a unique response to the needs
of a diverse city created by the 1896 consolidation of various county and
city governments into the present City of New York.' During the
Board's 110-year history6 its powers, composition and influence have
often changed,7 but it has always remained an "organic response to the
necessity of administering a governmental agency which encompassed
several autonomous constituencies." 8 In its present form, the Board con-
sists of the Mayor, the Comptroller and the City Council President, each
of whom is elected city-wide and casts two votes, and of the Presidents of
the five boroughs, each of whom casts one vote.9 This composition en-
sures that the three city-wide officials can constitute a majority,"° even in
the face of unanimous opposition by Borough Presidents."' This voting
5. See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
6. Predecessors to the Board of Estimate include the 1853 Board of Commissioners,
consisting of the Mayor, Comptroller, Recorder, President of the Board of Aldermen and
President of the Board of Assessments, which passed on certain appropriations prior to
submission to the Board of Supervisors; the 1864 Board of Estimate and Apportionment,
created to estimate the expenses of the Metropolitan Police District and composed of the
Commissioners of Police (appointed by the Governor) and the Comptrollers of Brooklyn
and New York City (appointed by their respective Councils); and the 1873 Board of
Estimate and Apportionment, composed of the Mayor, Comptroller, Commissioner of
Public Works and the President of the Department of Public Parks, which apportioned
real estate tax revenues. See W.H.K. Communications Assocs. Inc., The Structure, Pow-
ers and, Functions of New York City's Board of Estimate 1-2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Kramarsky Report], reprinted in I Joint App. A-154, A-160 to -161, Morris v. Board of
Estimate, 707 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1983) (compilation of court documents) [hereinafter
cited as Joint App.]; see W. Sayre & H. Kaufman, Governing New York City 626-52
(1960).
7. See infra Pt. I.
8. Kramarsky Report, supra note 6, at 1, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at A-
160.
9. See New York City Charter ch. 3, §§ 61-62 (Supp. 1984-85).
10. The exception to this rule lies in the formulation of the city's expense and capital
budgets. The expense budget is drawn up in preliminary form by the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, a mayoral agency. See id ch. 6, §§ 111-112 (1976 & Supp. 1984-85).
After hearings by committees of the City Council and the Board of Estimate, see id. § 115
(Supp. 1984-85), the Mayor submits a proposed budget to the Board and Council, see id.
§ 116. Either body may "increase, decrease, add or omit any unit of appropriation in the
budget as submitted by the mayor, or add, omit or change any terms or conditions of it."
Id. § 120(a) (1976). The Mayor does not participate in the vote on such changes, thus
giving Borough Presidents a majority of the remaining votes. See id. § 120(d). In addi-
tion, the Mayor may veto the budget adopted by the Board and the Council. See id.
§ 121(a) (Supp. 1984-85). In that case, however, a two-thirds majority, or 6 votes, is
needed to override the veto, see id. § 121(b), and this cannot be achieved by either Bor-
ough Presidents or city-wide officials alone. Procedures for adoption of the capital
budget are similar. See id. ch. 8, §§ 191-192, ch. 9, §§ 214, 216, 222-223 (1976 & Supp.
1984-85).
11. It should be noted that such a circumstance is rare. An analysis of the Board's
votes from February 3, 1980 to March 18, 1983 shows that 96.83% of the 13,380 votes
taken were unanimous. See Memorandum of Law for Defendant at 16, Morris v. Board
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structure gives equal voices to Borough Presidents representing constitu-
encies ranging from 350,000 to over 2,000,000 persons, thus spurring liti-
gation over the representative character of this enormously powerful
governmental body."1
The Board's most important functions are to develop the city budget,
to negotiate and approve all contracts and franchises for the city, and to
determine the use, development and improvement of property owned by
the city. 3 However, this recitation of powers falls to convey the enor-
of Estimate, 592 F. Supp. 1462 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Defendant's Memo-
randum]. In 111 of the 424 split votes, however, the three city-wide officials voted as a
bloc, thus making the Borough Presidents' votes moot. Id. Nevertheless, this extraordi-
narily high level of unanimity has been documented by older studies. See Kramarsky
Report, supra note 6, at 39-41, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at A-198 to -200
(956 of 1008 items on which a vote was taken during six 1971 meetings were passed
unanimously); New York State Comm'n on Governmental Operations of the City of
N.Y., II Background Research on the Top Structure of the Government of the City of
New York 32 (1961) (4660 of 4685 votes taken in 1959 were passed unani-
mously)[hereinafter cited as II Moore Commission Report]. Votes concerning contracts
and land use planning were the votes most frequently decided without unanimity. See
Kramarsky Report, supra note 6, at 42, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at A-201.
These same votes attracted most of the public testimony. See id. at 42-46, reprinted in
Joint App., supra note 6, at A-201 to -205.
12. See infra notes 141-52 and accompanying text.
13. The plaintiffs in Morris v. Board of Estimate, 551 F. Supp. 652 (E.D.N.Y. 1982),
rev'd, 707 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1983), on remand, 592 F. Supp. 1462 (E.D.N.Y. 1984),
presented the following list of the Board's powers:
A. The Board of Estimate exclusively
i. determines the use, development and improvement of property owned by
the City;
ii. approves standards, scopes and final designs of capitol [sic] projects for
the City;
iii. negotiates and enters into all contracts on behalf of the City.
iv. negotiates and approves all franchises that are granted by the City;
v. grants leases of City property and enters into leases of property for City
use;
vi. sets the rates for purchases of water from the City;
vii. sets the charges for sewer services provided by the City;
viii. approves or modifies all zoning decisions for the City; and
ix. sets tax abatements.
B. The Board of Estimate acting in conjunction with the New York City
Council
i. recommends and approves the expense budget of the City without the
participation of the Mayor;
. recommends and approves the capital budget of the City without the par-
ticipation of the Mayor;
iii. periodically modifies the budgets of the City;
iv. confers with the City Council when agreement on the budget between the
two bodies is not reached;
v. overrides mayoral vetoes of budget items without the participation of the
Mayor; and
vi. holds hearings on budgetary matters.
C. The Board of Estimate also
i. administers the Bureau of Franchises;
ii. administers the Bureau of the Secretary;
iii. holds public hearings on any matter of City policy within its responsibili-
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mous influence of the Board in city affairs. In its administrative capacity,
it coordinates agency actions so that the activities of one department do
not interfere with the projects of other departments. 4 In its budgetary
role, it exercises control over every city agency.15 In its role as business
manager, it approves every operation in which city money is used to hire
the services of private business. 6 Finally, the Board's land use and plan-
ning authority makes it the pre-eminent body directing real estate devel-
opment"7 in a city marked by extraordinary land values, acute housing
shortages and an economy based largely on its attraction of major busi-
nesses with large payrolls and enormous numbers of employees. In sum,
the Board represents a concentration of legislative, executive and admin-
istrative power in the hands of the eight most pre-eminent local offi-
cials-and, through them, in the county leaders of the Democratic
Partyl'-making it efficient and effective, while at the same time with-
holding a significant amount of authority from the members of the more
diverse City Council.
To a large degree, the Board of Estimate litigation turns on the mathe-
matical description of the existing power structure of New York.
Supreme Court decisions have long focused on equality of representa-
tion,' 9 which is determined by the use of mathematical models that cal-
culate the relative disenfranchisement and over-enfranchisement of
portions of a given population.2' In order to be useful, however, these
models must realistically reflect the power distributions of a representa-
tional system. This requires a definition of the power to be equalized.
Clearly the Constitution does not guarantee each person an equal
voice; for example, many individuals have superior access to media and
thus a stronger voice in political debate. Rather, the Constitution guar-
antees that each citizen's vote will have equal force. The force of that
vote can be measured by a citizen's contribution to the election of a par-
ticular candidate.2 ' However, even this is not enough. For instance, two
ties whenever called upon to do so by the Mayor or in its discretion for the
public interest;
iv. holds hearings on tax abatements that are within the discretion of City
administrative agencies; and
v. makes recommendations to the Mayor or City Council in, supra note 6,
regard to any matter of city policy.
Statement of Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 9(g), Morris v. Board of Estimate, 707 F.2d
686 (2d Cir. 1983), reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at A-140 to -42.
14. See New York City Charter ch. 3, § 67(2), (3), (7) (1976).
15. See id. ch. 6, §§ 112(a), 115-116, 119-120; ch. 9, §§ 214(a), 216, 219, 221-222
(1976 & Supp. 1984-85).
16. See id. ch. 13, §§ 342, 349.
17. See id. ch. 13, § 67(1),(4),(5),(7), ch. 8, § 197-a (1976 & Supp. 1984-85).
18. See infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 242 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Pt. IV.
21. See infra notes 249-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the mathematics
used to compare one citizen's ability to contribute to the election of a candidate with that
of another citizen who resides in a larger district.
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districts of 10,000 persons who cast a single vote apiece does not meet
constitutional standards if the first district elects a representative who
holds two votes on the governing body and the second district's represen-
tative holds only one. Thus, voting equality also means that each repre-
sentative of equally populated districts has the same amount of absolute
legislative power,22 implying as a corollary that equal numbers of constit-
uents deserve equal amounts of absolute legislative power. New York
City's Board of Estimate fails to meet this latter condition, because resi-
dents of the most populous borough, Brooklyn, are represented by the
same amount of absolute power through their Borough President as resi-
dents of the least populous borough, Staten Island (Richmond County).
The inquiry cannot end here, however, because if competing policies
can justify the deviation, the Constitution does not require absolute
equality in voting power.23 In such instances, the Supreme Court has
balanced the extent of the representational deviation against the impor-
tance of the competing policies. Choosing a mathematical model to de-
fine representation, (in other words, power) and to calculate the
deviation from ideal equality of representation is not, therefore, merely a
"imbroglio of mathematical manipulation. '2 4 Rather, it is a sincere at-
tempt to describe political reality in a fashion that is useful to the balanc-
ing process. Considering that different mathematical models have
estimated the Board's deviation as ranging from near zero to 330%,25 it
is clear that selecting one model or another can predetermine the result
when balancing these conflicting policies.
In addition to its local impact, the Board of Estimate litigation will be
important to counties, cities and towns across the country as they experi-
ment with forms of local government designed to balance centralization
with local autonomy, majority authority with minority representation,
and relative efficiency with broad-based participation in governm6nt.
The Board of Estimate falls on the extreme end of the spectrum of local
governments subjected to one-person, one-vote requirements. Its mem-
bers are elected to individual offices, but serve on the Board ex officio.
Furthermore, while the Board equalizes the voting strength of local offi-
cials from large and small constituencies, it subjects them to a majority
voting bloc of city-wide officials. In sum, the Board's structure favors the
relative efficiency of a small body of top officials and the preservation of
minority interests over the representative character of the purely legisla-
tive City Council.
22. The term "absolute" power refers to the number of votes held by a legislator.
Obviously some legislators have more relative power than others, whether by seniority,
association or force of personality. Furthermore, where districts are of unequal size and
legislators are given weighted votes in compensation, absolute power is best defined in
terms of "decisive" or "critical" votes. See infra notes 258-96 and accompanying text.
23. See infra. Pt. VIII.
24. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 319 n.6 (examination of floterial districts), modi-
fied, 411 U.S. 922 (1973). See infra note 225 for a discussion of floterial districts.
25. See infra notes 197-225, 298-316 and accompanying text.
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The resolution of the constitutional issues relating to the representative
structure of the Board offers the courts an excellent opportunity to ex-
plore the extent to which public policy considerations can sustain malap-
portionment of district seats in order to preserve the boundaries of
existing communities and political subdivisions. If the litigation reaches
the Supreme Court, it will open the door for a fresh discussion of the
kinds of governmental bodies, legislative or not, that should be subject to
the one-person, one-vote protections of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.26
Part I of this Article presents a brief history of the Board of Estimate.
Particular attention is paid to the changing balance of power between the
central city government and the governments of the five boroughs com-
prising the City of New York. Although a complete history would be
fascinating, it is hardly within the scope of this Article. Nevertheless,
familiarity with these materials is important to students of municipal
government and to those desiring a more complete picture of the political
tensions surrounding the current Board of Estimate litigation. In addi-
tion, this history describes the vested interests and massive inertia likely
to face those who wish to reform the structure of New York City govern-
ment, and thus foreshadows many of the issues likely to arise in the event
a new Charter Revision Commission is appointed in response to the
Board of Estimate litigation.
Those readers primarily interested in mathematical modeling of polit-
ical institutions and the constitutional issues regarding apportionment
may wish to by-pass the historical materials of Part I, and turn directly
to Part II, which presents the current structure and powers of the Board
and describes the litigation to date. Part III discusses the applicability of
the one-person, one-vote principle to a governmental body whose mem-
bers are appointed ex officio, a not uncommon structure of government
in New York State. Part IV introduces the traditional mathematical
models used to assess whether political institutions comply with these
one-person, one-vote requirements. Three such models have been used
to date in the Board of Estimate litigation, and each is discussed in detail.
Parts V and VI of the Article describe a more sensitive mathematical
analysis of political institutions, and apply this analysis to today's Board
of Estimate. This alternative analysis employs the concept of "critical"
votes, which have a decisive effect on the outcome of a legislative motion
or general election.
Part VII proposes a new weighted voting structure for the Board of
Estimate, which is examined using critical votes analysis. In Part VIII,
the constitutional justifications for deviation from perfect one-person,
26. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to
review a district court decision holding that political gerrymandering of state legislative
districts violates the equal protection clause. Baudemer v. Davis, No. IP-82-56-C (D.S.
Ind. Dec. 12, 1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3680 (U.S. March 26, 1985). Thus it
appears the Supreme Court is again interested in resolving novel questions in this area.
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one-vote compliance are explored generally and specifically with respect
to this Article's proposal for weighted voting for the Board. The Article
concludes that although the proposed weighted voting scheme tests some
constitutional limits, it nevertheless fulfills certain policy objectives ac-
cepted by the Supreme Court and exemplified by nearly one hundred
years of New York City history, and therefore is constitutional by to-
day's standards for local government.27
I. HISTORY OF THE BOARD OF ESTIMATE
The City of New York was created by state law in 1896 28 in response
to a report by the Municipal Consolidation Commission29 and a non-
binding voter referendum.30 The consolidation was designed to increase
the efficiency of newly developing municipal services and to decrease
political corruption in the greater metropolitan area.31 Since then the
city government has reflected the changing power relationships between
the central government and the boroughs.
In 1898, New York City's first charter created a bicameral legislature,
named the Municipal Assembly,32 to govern the newly consolidated five
borough city, and continued the Board of Estimate and Apportionment,
which had been created in 1873 to manage the city's budget.33 The
Board consisted of the Comptroller, the President of the Board of Alder-
men,34 the Mayor, the President of the Department of Taxes and Assess-
ment, and the Corporation Counsel.35 On this Board, the Mayor and his
appointees held three of five votes, thus beginning a pattern of consoli-
dating power in the hands of the Mayor, his appointees and other city-
27. See infra notes 372-94 and accompanying text.
28. 1896 N.Y. Laws 488.
29. This Commission was set up in 1890 "to inquire into the expediency of consoli-
dating the various municipalities in the state of New York, occupying the several islands
in the harbor of New York." 1890 N.Y. Laws 311.
30. See 1894 N.Y. Laws 64.
31. See F. Shaw, The History of the New York City Legislature 3-8 (1954).
32. The Municipal Assembly consisted of a 60 member Board of Aldermen and a 29
member City Council. See Greater New York Charter §§ 18, 19, 24 & App. III (1897)
(city council of 29 members, board of aldermen consisting of one alderman for each of 56
assembly districts and one from each of the four areas specifically listed in the section).
For a general discussion of New York City Charter revisions with respect to City Council
Membership see New York City Charter Revision Comm'n, Proposed Amendments to
the Charter for the City of New York 357-70 (1983) (available in files of Fordham Law
Review) [hereinafter cited as Sovern Commission Report]. See generally F. Shaw, supra
note 31, for a complete history of the New York City Council.
33. See Kramarsky Report, supra note 6, at 2, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at
A-161.
34. Id at 1-2, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at A-160 to -161. Beginning in
1884, the Comptroller and the President of the Board of Aldermen were popularly
elected, rather than appointed by the Common Council, which had supervised city prop-
erty in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. See id.
35. Id. at 2, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at A-161. The Corporation Counsel




The 1898 charter removed final budget authority from the Board by
allowing the Municipal Assembly to reduce any budget item without fur-
ther review by the Board.37 In addition to the Board and the Municipal
Assembly, a Board of Public Improvements existed at the executive level
to regulate capital expenditures.3" Borough Presidents could sit on the
Board of Public Improvements but could only vote on matters concern-
ing their own boroughs,39 thus limiting their city-wide influence. To-
gether the "Board of Estimate and the Board of Public Improvements
served as a check on the possible extravagances of the Municipal Assem-
bly in the area of capital expenditures."'
By 1901, a coalition of Republicans, insurgents and Brooklyn Demo-
crats, dismayed by their exclusion from the Manhattan-dominated Dem-
ocratic city government, "push[ed] through a series of amendments to
the 1898 Charter."4 These amendments replaced the City Council with
a strengthened Board of Estimate, but retained the Board of Aldermen as
the "new unicameral City Legislature."'42 The amendments also radi-
cally altered the structure of the Board of Estimate. The new Board
combined the functions of the old Board of Estimate and the Board of
Public Improvements, and its membership was changed to include the
Mayor, the Comptroller, the President of the Board of Aldermen, and
the five Borough Presidents.43 Three votes were granted to each of the
three city-wide officials, two votes to the Borough Presidents of the two
largest boroughs, Brooklyn and Manhattan, and one vote to each of the
other Borough Presidents.' This voting structure institutionalized the
36. See id. The President of Taxes and Assessments and the Corporation Counsel
were mayoral appointees. See id.
37. See id. at 3, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at A-162. It should be noted,
however, that the Municipal Assembly could not add to the budget. See Id. The Board's
other functions continued unchanged, including estimating the budget, establishing the
tax rates, transferring funds among departments and issuing stocks and bonds. See id. at
2, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at A-161.
38. See id. at 3, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at A-162. This board consisted
of the Mayor, Comptroller and the heads of the city departments. Id.
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 4, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at A-163.
42. Id. at 5, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at A-164.
43. See id.





Staten Island (S.I.) 67,021
Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1960, at 20 (1960). These
weighted votes did not proportionally reflect the borough populations. Furthermore, the
city officials held nine votes, a simple majority, thus setting a pattern of power distribu-
tion between city officials and Borough Presidents that remains to this day.
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pattern, still seen on today's Board, in which the city-wide officials can
form a majority even in the face of unanimous opposition by the Borough
Presidents. However, the Borough Presidents then had full voting power
on every measure, which reflected the drafters' conviction that it is
"proper that the boroughs should have a direct representation on the
Board.""a
The drafters of this new charter wrote in 1900:
[T]he Board of Estimate and Apportionment under our draft charter
will be the most important body in the City government. Whatever
dissatisfaction may have been felt with any other municipal body, the
Board of Estimate and Apportionment has generally given satisfaction
for its capacity, efficiency and integrity. Under the plan of the Com-
mission it will be in reality the centre of all legislative activity in rela-
tion to financial affairs, and of much of the administrative activity of
the City. It will be in effect an upper house of the City Legislature and
also a cabinet of the most important administrative officers.46
Thus by the 1900's the new Board of Estimate represented a partial
redistribution of executive power away from the Mayor and toward de-
centralization. The five Borough Presidents now had significant influ-
ence over the city's budget and received broad executive authority over
the delivery of municipal service, borough planning and development.47
From 1901 to 1936, the Board of Estimate grew in power and prestige,
largely because the 1901 charter granted it the residual powers of the
City-those powers not specifically granted to other agencies.48 Indeed,
in 1924, under the new City Home Rule Law,49 de jure recognition was
given to the Board's status when it was officially designated as the upper
house of the municipal legislature.5 The plan was for the Board of Esti-
45. New York State Charter Revision Comm'n, Report of the Charter Revision Com-
mission to the Governor of the State of New York 19 (1900) (hereinafter cited as 1900
Report].
46. Id. at 18.
47. See Kramarsky Report, supra note 6, at 4-5, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6,
at A-163 to -164. The Borough Presidents also inherited the supervision of highways,
sewers and public buildings from the old Board of Improvements. See id. at 5, reprinted
in Joint App., supra note 6, at A-164.
48. Id. at 5, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at A-164. For example, in 1905, as
a result of a scandal concerning the Board of Aldermen, the Board gained the power to
grant franchises and generally to control "all the streets, avenues, highways, boulevards,
concourses, driveways, bridges, tunnels, parks, parkways, waterways, docks, bulkheads,
wharves, piers and all public grounds and waters which are within or belong to the city."
Greater New York Charter, ch. 14, § 242(3), 1905 N.Y. Laws 629. The Board gained the
authority to pass on improvements in 1911, see id. ch. 1, § 247, 1911 N.Y. Laws 679, to
create zoning regulations in 1916, see id. ch. 1, § 242, 1916 N.Y. Laws 497, and to be the
trustee for the City Employee Retirement System in 1920, see id. ch. 1, § 1704, 1920 N.Y.
Laws 427. Following the 1924 Charter Revision, city powers were redistributed, how-
ever, and residual powers were returned to the Board of Aldermen. See infra note 51 and
accompanying text.
49. See 1924 N.Y. Laws 363.
50. Kramarsky Report, supra note 6, at 7, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at A-
166.
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mate to run the city's business affairs while the Board of Aldermen ran
its legislative affairs.51 Unfortunately this did not occur. Instead, the
Board of Aldermen sank in prestige and power and became a "rubber
stamp" for the Board and for the Democratic party. 52
The early 1930's saw another major charter reform movement.53 The
movement was spurred by disclosures of widespread government mis-
management54 by the monolithic Democratic Party,55 and by the need to
relieve the Board of some of its overwhelming responsibilities for land-
use planning. These problems had resulted in part from federal public
works programs and had led to some undesirable log-rolling practices.
5 6
To help alleviate these problems, the Thacher Commission" proposed
the creation of a City Planning Commission, appointed by the Mayor.58
The Commission's recommendations "could be overruled only by a
3/4ths majority vote of the Board of Estimate."59 Members of the Board
51. This followed the 1924 charter revision effort, which set forth a scheme for divid-
ing municipal power in the following manner: taxing and purely "legislative powers" to
the Board of Aldermen, business and routine administrative decisionmaking to the Board
of Estimate and Apportionment, politically or financially sensitive administrative deci-
sionmaking to both bodies jointly and all residuary powers to the Board of Aldermen.
See The New York Charter Comm'n, Report of the New York Charter Commission with
a Draft of Charter for the City of New York 10 (1923).
52. The abolition of the Board of Aldermen ... will result in no injury to the
City of New York.
... As Borough President Harvey frankly admitted before the Committee:
'They say the members of the Board of Aldermen are rubber-stamps and I can
see that they are, because if they don't do what they are told, they are put out.'
Joint Legislative Comm. to Investigate the Admin. of the Various Dep'ts of the Gov't of
the City of N.Y., In re The Investigation of the Departments of the Government of the City
of New York 19 (1932). One commentator has stated:
In this scheme of things the Board of Aldermen became a mere cog in the party
machine, its chief function being to ratify those decisions of the party chiefs
which required the sanction of the board in conformity with the city charter
.... Overwhelming Democratic majorities, especially after 1921, made the
task relatively simple. During this sixteen-year period the board went through
the motions of conducting business in a constitutional manner;, in reality it was
a travesty of a legislative body.
F. Shaw, supra note 31, at 34.
53. See Kramarsky Report, supra note 6, at 7-8, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6,
at A-166 to -167. "This movement came to fruition in the form of the Thacher Commis-
sion." Id. at 8, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at A-167. See New York City
Charter Revision Comm'n, Preliminary Report and Draft of Proposed Charter for the
City of New York 1 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Thacher Commission Report].
54. F. Shaw, supra note 31, at 152-53. The disclosures were made by Judge Seabury.
See id.
55. Between 1922 and 1937, the Democratic majority averaged 89% of the represen-
tation on the Board of Aldermen. In fact, in the 1932-33 session, only one Republican sat
among 64 Democrats. See id. at 28.
56. See Kramarsky Report, supra note 6, at 8, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at
A-167.
57. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
58. See Thacher Commission Report, supra note 53, at 8.




saw this as an attempt to increase the power of the Mayor at their ex-
pense.' However, the Board's membership was left unchanged by the
Charter reformers. Commenting on the role of the Borough Presidents
on the Board, the drafters wrote:
The right of each borough to separate and direct representation in
the administration of the city's government is maintained by continu-
ing the borough presidents as members of the board .... It is the
conviction of the Commission that such representation is not only im-
portant in the interest of the boroughs but in the interest of the city as
a whole. Those who administer the manifold affairs of the city should
be intimately familiar with the conditions and needs of the five
boroughs. 61
Thus, despite wanting to reduce the Board's municipal planning powers,
the drafters still recognized a substantial need for direct representation of
the boroughs on the Board.
The Thacher Commission also proposed a number of other significant
changes in city government that affected borough power. Its unanimous
report and preliminary draft called for a strong mayor, retention of the
Board of Estimate, and a smaller, thirty-two member City Council to
serve as a unicameral legislature, replacing the Board of Aldermen.62 To
elect the new City Council, the Commission submitted a proposal for
proportional representation (P.R.)6  directly to the electorate without
recommendation. The new system was designed to increase minority
party representation and used the boroughs as the basis for the new legis-
lative delegations." However, because an act of the 1934 state legislature
60. See id.
61. Thacher Commission Report, supra note 53, at 17.
62. See id. at 5-I1.
63. See id. at 5.
64. See F. Shaw, supra note 31, at 167. Proportional representation (P.R.) is a voting
device used in multi-member districts. A voter can cast ballots for as many candidates as
he or she wishes, marking each candidate in order of preference. If a first choice candi-
date has already gathered a number of votes sufficient to determine his election or defeat,
the ballot is counted toward the next most preferred candidate whose success or defeat is
still uncertain. The net result is a slate of elected candidates that should accurately reflect
underlying voting sentiment. As an example, for a slate of ten candidates in a city that is
60% Democrat and 40% Republican, traditional majoritarian voting schemes should
elect ten Democrats and P.R. should elect six Democrats and four Republicans. For a
more extensive discussion of proportional representation see Sovern Commission Report,
supra note 32, at 643-63. Many commentators have also discussed proportional represen-
tation. See, e.g., G. Hallett, Proportional Representation-The Key to Democracy
(1940); McCaffrey, Municipal Affairs, 33 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 841 (1939); Zeller & Bone,
American Government and Politics--The Repeal of P.R. in New York City--Ten Years in
Retrospect, 42 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1127 (1948); Zimmerman, The Federal Voting Rights
Act and Alternative Election Systems, 19 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 621, 640-50 (1978). For
a criticism of the mathematical basis of P.R., see Brains & Fishburn, Some Logical De-
fects of the Single Transferable Vote, in Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alter-
natives 147 (G. Pomper ed. 1984).
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required any proposal for P.R. to be submitted separately to the voters,65
and because the Thacher Commission feared P.R.'s defeat, the Commis-
sion recommended retention of the Board of Estimate." Otherwise, if
P.R. were defeated and a traditional City Council were elected from the
districts, the resulting consolidation of power in the City Council could
have given the Democratic Party permanent control of the City.67
In 1936 the voters of New York adopted the Thacher Commission's
proposals in full.6 s The result was to redistribute city power once again.
Boroughs became significant power bases through their legislative dele-
gations, with each borough being a single constituency and electing one
council member for every 75,000 valid P.R. ballots.6 9 The Board of Esti-
mate, retained as a safeguard against the defeat of the P.R. proposal,
became the pre-eminent executive and administrative government organ.
Through the Board, the Borough Presidents came to play a crucial role
in formulating the city's capital and expense budgets, selling and leasing
city property, granting franchises and setting municipal salaries.' ° Even
the city's planning functions, which the 1936 Charter purported to place
in the hands of the Mayor's City Planning Commission, actually re-
mained within the Board's control. This occurred because in Child v.
Moses,'1 the New York Appellate Division held that the Commission
was an advisory body that could not execute city powers or expend city
funds without approval or acquiescence by the Board.' The new struc-
ture of government placed the responsibility for making law in the hands
of the City Council, which consisted of delegations elected at-large by
P.R. from each of the boroughs.73 The Board, with its five Borough
65. See Thacher Commission Report, supra note 53, at 15; F. Shaw, supra note 31, at
163.
66. See Thacher Commission Report, supra note 53, at 13; F. Shaw, supra note 31, at
163-64.
67. F. Shaw, supra note 31, at 163-64.
68. See Sovern Commission Report, supra note 32, at 361; Kramarsky Report, supra
note 6, at 9, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at A-168.
69. F. Shaw, supra note 31, at 167.
70. See Kramarsky Report, supra note 6, at 11, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6,
at A-170. However, the power of the Borough Presidents to maintain public buildings
was transferred to the Department of Public Works and the power to cite building viola-
tions was transferred to the Department of Housing and Buildings. Id. at 9-10, reprinted
in Joint App., supra note 6, at A-168 to -169.
71. 265 A.D. 353, 38 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1942), aff'd mer., 290 N.Y. 828, 50 N.E.2d 235,
modified mer., 290 N.Y. 925, 50 N.E.2d 307 (1943).
72. Id.
73. In their report the Thacher Commission stated:
The relative functions of the Council and the Board of Estimate are altered in
several important respects. The Council is the legislative body and is vested
with the entire legislative power of the city. All municipal legislation is to be by
local law, rather than by ordinance, and local laws may be initiated only in the
Council, which will alone constitute the local legislative body under the City
Home Rule Law. The primary function of the Board of Estimate, on the other
hand, is to direct the business affairs of the city. It will have no control over
legislation except that local laws having to do with certain subjects directly re-
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Presidents exerting significant but not decisive control, acted as a check
on the City Council and as the primary authority over city finances.74
While the structure of the Board of Estimate under the 1936 charter
remained unchanged until 1958, P.R. and the City Council did not fare
as well. From its inception in 1937, the system of P.R. was a subject of
near constant debate.75 Its strength and its flaw were the same. Its
strength was its ability to assure proportional minority representation on
the City Council 76 by limiting Democrats to only one-half of its seats,
thus reflecting the true extent of their popular support.77 Its considered
lated to the organization and administration of the government and amend-
ments to the charter require its approval. It also passes upon the expense budget
as submitted by the Mayor and the capital budget as submitted by the City
Planning Commission. . . Local laws may be vetoed by the Mayor subject to
the power of the Council to pass them over such veto by a two-thirds' vote.
Thacher Commission Report, supra note 53, at 6.
74. In describing the Board's financial responsibilities the Thacher Commission
reported:
The Board of Estimate exercises no control over legislation except to check
the Council in respect to the organization and administration of the government
and to approve or disapprove amendments to the charter. It has general control
over the financial policy of the city. It passes upon the Mayor's budget and is
free to amend it by adding, increasing, decreasing or omitting items. After the
Board of Estimate has passed the budget, it goes to the Council, which may
only reduce or strike out the amounts appropriated for particular items. The
Board of Estimate holds hearings so that it is before this small body of elected
officers that the people have an opportunity to criticise the budget or any item
in it.
Id. at 16. Some commentators maintain that the Council's role in the budgetary process
was largely "formal and symbolic" because the Mayor was authorized to veto any Coun-
cil amendments to the budget, and a three-fourths vote of the Council was necessary to
override the veto. See W. Sayre & H. Kaufman, supra note 6, at 627.
In addition to its power to enact the budget, the Board possessed significant financial
powers over which it exercised exclusive control. The most extensive and important of
these was the Board's authority to alter the expense budget during the fiscal year by
transferring funds from one appropriation to another. See New York City Charter, ch. 6,
§ 127 (1936). This power permitted the Board substantially to remake the budget after its
enactment. Other significant financial powers of the Board included its powers and duty
to fix the salaries and grades of city employees, id. ch. 3, §§ 67, 68; to approve the rates to
be charged for water, id. ch. 30, § 734(4), wharfage, id. ch. 29, § 709(b), and for lease of
city property, id. ch. 15, § 384(b); to regulate the letting of contracts, id. ch. 13, § 343(a);
to set standard specifications for city purchases, id. ch. 13, § 347; and to regulate the
acquisition and sale of city property and materials, id. ch. 15, § 384(a). In addition, the
Board supervised the city's assessable improvements system, id. ch. 12, § 300, and headed
the city's Employee Retirement System, id. ch. 3, § 71(a). The Board also had the power
to grant franchises by setting aside streets and other lands for market purposes. Id. ch.
14, § 362. Finally, all the residual powers of the City were vested in the Board. Id. ch. 3,
§ 70. The Board was thus heir to all the powers generally vested in the City unless other-
wise provided by law.
75. See, e.g., G. Hallett, supra note 64, at 153-55; MeCaffrey, supra note 64, at 845;
Zeller & Bone, supra note 64, at 1127-28.
76. See G. Hallett, supra note 64, at 149.
77. For example, in the last election before P.R., sixty-two of the sixty-five members
of the Board of Aldermen were Democrats; in the first P.R. election, the Democrats
gathered half the City Council seats and fifty percent of the popular vote. Id.
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weakness at that time, however, was that the Councils elected by P.R.
consistently resulted in the election of representatives of the small but
well organized Communist and American Labor parties."8 After World
War II, as anti-Communist sentiment grew in the United States, advo-
cates for repeal attacked P.R. for its propensity toward minority repre-
sentation. Some critics even candidly denied the premise that an election
arrangement giving representation to political minorities was either
sound or desirable.79 In addition, although Republicans gained more
seats with P.R. than with the traditional ward system, the party's leader-
ship could not prevent the nomination and election of so-called "in-
dependent Republicans," and so joined the repeal movements." In 1948,
P.R. was repealed and elections returned to the use of wards based on the
city's twenty-five state senatorial districts." In the 1948 election, the
Democratic Party captured twenty-four of the twenty-five council seats,
despite gathering only 52.6% of the popular vote. 2
Thus, by 1949, the boroughs were no longer the definitive power base
for the City Council, which was now elected from districts. However,
the Board of Estimate, and through it the Borough Presidents, still exer-
cised enormous executive control over the city's finances and real estate.
In addition, the Board acted as a check on Democratic Party ward poli-
tics, thereby achieving the purpose for which it had been designed by the
Thacher Commission in the event that P.R. was defeated. 3
In 1958 the boroughs and the Board of Estimate were once again af-
fected by charter revision efforts when, in response to population growth
in Queens, Staten Island and the Bronx, the voting powers of the Bor-
ough Presidents were equalized. 4 Although the boroughs were still of
78. The Council elected in 1937 was composed of 26 members: 15 Democrats, 5
American Labor Party members, 3 Republicans, 3 City Fusion Party Members. Id. In
1945, the Communist and American Labor parties gathered 18% of the first-choice vote
and 17.5% of the Council seats. See Zimmerman, supra note 48, at 649. The New York
Herald Tribune, looking back on the 1937 election, stated: "P.R. in fact operated magnifi-
cently then. It raised tremendously the character of representation in the council...
and gave it a political division in reasonable accordance with the real sentiment of the
city." G. Hallett, supra note 64, at 151 (quoting N.Y. Herald Tribune, Oct. 6, 1939, at 24,
col. 2).
79. See Zeller & Bone, supra note 64, at 1133-34. It was argued that P.R. was "sub-
versive of the two-party system and gave a 'lion's roar to irresponsible fleas,' magnifying
'out of all legitimate or decent proportion voices belonging to the tiniest fractions of our
people.'" Id. at 1134 (quoting N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1947, at 16, col. 6).
80. See id. at 1128.
81. See F. Shaw, supra note 31, at 208-09. Note that this was practically identical to
the alternative plan prepared by the Thacher Commission in the event P.R. was defeated.
Under the alternative plan the Commission proposed: "Pending reapportionment of the
senatorial districts equality of representation will be partially restored by providing that
until a reapportionment is effected there shall be elected in addition to the councilmen
chosen from the senatorial districts two Councilmen at large from each of the boroughs
.." Thacher Commission Report, supra note 53, at 14.
82. See Zimmerman, supra note 64, at 646 n.123.
83. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
84. See Kramarsky Report, supra note 6, at 11, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6,
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vastly different populations, 5 each Borough President received two
votes, and each city official received four votes, thus retaining the city
officials' bloc-voting majority. 6 However, equalizing voting strength
was not the only change in the offing; technological and social develop-
ments were moving the city toward further centralization. 7
Nevertheless, while centralizing city government was clearly on the
political agenda, the concentration of that central authority was still un-
certain. In 1960, the State Commission on Governmental Operations of
the City of New York (Moore Commission) criticized the concentration
of broad powers in the hands of the Board, 8 maintaining that "[t]he
Board's practice of reaching decisions in camera, prior to hearing public
testimony, frustrated the voters who wished to participate in the deci-
sion-making process."8 9 The Moore Commission concluded that the am-
at A-170. These changes were made by state law in response to a home rule request from
the City Council. See 1958 N.Y. Laws 719(a).






See Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1961, at 25 (1961).
86. See Kramarsky Report, supra note 6, at 11, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6,
at A-170. Some legislators objected to equalizing the voting strength among the bor-
oughs. Stanley Isaacs, Minority Leader for the City Council, wrote to the Governor's
Counsel urging the Governor to veto the bill:
Since the Board of Estimate is a body which passes on all budgets, spending the
City's money, it seems sound to me that the boroughs which contribute so
much should have more to say than the boroughs which contribute far less.
This is highlighted by the fact that the Borough President of Richmond
(Staten Island) is given two votes. The population is approximately 2 1/2% of
the total population of the City. The assessed value of the Borough is approxi-
mately 2% of the total assessed value. It is absurd that they should have equal
weight on the Board of Estimate ....
Letter from Stanley M. Isaacs to Daniel Gutman (April 3, 1958), reprinted in 1958 N.Y.
Laws 719 (bill jacket).
87. In spite of these [1958] alterations, the Board of Estimate was essentially the
same at [sic] it had been in 1901. The city, however, had changed drastically. In
1901, the city was a loose consolidation of formerly autonomous entities. The
growth of the subway system, the mass use of automobiles along the city's high-
way system, and the introduction of the telephone and television slowly inte-
grated city life. Technology was making centralization of city government more
feasible. The expansion of the city's budget and the ever-blossoming variety of
services it provided led many to recommend such centralization.
Kramarsky Report, supra note 6, at 12, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at A-171.
88. See Kramarsky Report, supra note 6, at 12, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6,
at A-171.
89. Id. (emphasis in original). In describing the procedures of the Board of Estimate
the Kramarsky Report states:
The executive session, an informal and confidential meeting at which no rec-
ord of the proceedings is taken, creates the optimum conditions for the Board to
assert its unique role in the city's governmental process.
...Each member [of the Board] by participating in the executive sessions is
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biguous division of authority among the Mayor, the Board, the Borough
Presidents and the City Council made it difficult for voters to assign re-
sponsibility for policy decisions, and that the structure should be re-
placed by a strong Mayor, a more independent and powerful Council,
and a Board of Estimate limited largely to planning matters.9'
In 1961 the Mayor appointed a new Charter Revision Commission
(Cahill Commission) under authority granted by the State Legislature.9
The Commission proposed a new charter, which took effect on January
1, 1963.92 This charter made some profound changes in city government,
many of which reduced the power of the Borough Presidents both di-
expected to hold to his position at the public meeting and only the rare instance
of new and persuasive testimony or an overwhelmingly negative public reaction
will change the positions of Board members after the executive session.
Critics of the Board of Estimate's present procedures argue that the Board
should not reach decisions in executive sessions prior to public hearing. [But
this].. . would serve to delay decisions on the overwhelming majority of items
on which there is no controversy. Furthermore, since virtually all controversial
items have previously been subject of [sic] public debate, this. . . would be a
dubious benefit even with regard to such items.
Id. at 23-26, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at A-182 to -185. Despite these re-
marks, public sentiment exists in favor of eliminating the in camera decisionmaking on
the Board and the use of delegates at the public meetings to cast votes in accordance with
the members' prior positions. For example, at the Sovern Commission's Bronx hearings,
Mr. Angelo Campanaro, President of the Chester Civic Association, testified as follows:
I think it's a disgrace that goes on now. A tremendous issue comes up at a
public hearing, and the people come. New facts are brought out. They have
expert testimony and contradictory maybe to other testimony. And immedi-
ately following the testimony, without the Borough President being there, or the
Mayor, or [the City Council President], or the Controller [sic], they [the dele-
gates] take a vote. I think that's scandalous. The people are disgusted. They
feel they do not have a say. And what's the sense of us going before a public
hearing of the Board. ... They [the Board members] do not know what came
up at the last meeting at the last minute, and their aide votes.
You know, heaven help the guy who doesn't know the ropes that maybe
he can't get to the Mayor's staff before. Most people don't know that. They
think this is the ultimate, you come before the Board of Estimate and you are
going to present it on the first shot, and then you find you only have two mem-
bers to speak to.
Transcripts of the N.Y. City Charter Revision Commission Public Hearings, Bronx
County Courthouse, at 87, 90 (Feb. 3, 1983) (available in files of Fordham Law Review).
90. See Kramarsky Report, supra note 6, at 12, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6,
at A-171.
91. See Charter Revision Comm'n of the City of N.Y., Report of the Charter Revi-
sion Commission of the City of New York 1 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Cahill Commis-
sion Report]. The City Council and the Board of Estimate feared the possibilities of
charter revision at this time, particularly in light of political feuding between the Mayor
and the county leaders. Because the Mayor chose to run for re-election with new running
mates, both bodies refused to appropriate monies for the Commission. See Kramarsky
Report, supra note 6, at 12-13, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at A-171 to -172.




reetly at the borough level and indirectly at the level of the Board.93
First, it significantly reduced the Board of Estimate's power over the
budget.94 Specifically, changes made in the budget by either the Board of
Estimate or the City Council would be subject to mayoral veto, which
could be overridden only by a two-thirds vote by each body.95 In addi-
tion, the Board lost its line-by-line supervision of the expense budget,
96
and the Mayor, rather than the Board, was empowered to authorize in-
creases of up to fifteen percent for projects included in the capital
budget.9 7 The Board retained its traditional authority over zoning,
franchises and leases, 98 but residual powers of the City were vested in the
Mayor rather than in the Board.99
The changes taking place in 1963 also affected the boroughs. The Bor-
ough Presidents lost some of their executive power with respect to the
delivery of city services."° In exchange, however, each borough gained
two new City Council members, to be elected at large.101 These seats
were designed to increase the status and prestige of the Council0 2 by
adding members with a broader vision than that of district representa-
tives.10 3 At the same time, it introduced the concept of borough repre-
sentation and minority party representation on the City Council for the
93. See id. One commentator summarized the effect of these changes as an "integra-
tion of services, reduction of county and borough autonomy, and reduction of the powers
of the Board of Estimate through a shift in authority to the Mayor and a legislative body
representing the city as a whole." Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment
Decisions on Counties and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 21,
38 (1965).
94. See Kramarsky Report, supra note 6, at 13, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6,
at A-172.
95. See Cahill Commission Report, supra note 91, at 20-21 (proposed charter for the
City of New York).
96. See id. at 21; Kramarsky Report, supra note 6, at 13, reprinted in Joint App.,
supra note 6, at A-172.
97. See Kramarsky Report, supra note 6, at 13, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6,
at A-172. This forced the Board to approve or disapprove entire programs, obviously a
far more difficult task politically.
98. See Cahill Commission Report, supra note 91, at 4; Kramarsky Report, supra
note 6, at 14, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at A-173. The Board also retained
certain powers concerning urban renewal plans, plans for public and publicly assisted
housing, and grants of tax exemptions by virtue of the state legislation. See id. at 14,
reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at A-173.
99. See Cahill Commission Report, supra note 91, at 3. See supra note 64 for a dis-
cussion of these powers.
100. See Kramarsky Report, supra note 6, at 14, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6,
at A-173. These powers had been granted under the 1901 Charter in a backlash against
the advisory, figurehead office of the Borough President. See F. Shaw, supra note 31, at
11-13.
101. See Cahill Commission Report, supra note 91, at 3. Such at-large seats were first
recommended in 1936 by the Thacher Commission. See supra note 81.
102. See New York State Comm'n on Governmental Operations of the City of N.Y., A
New Charter for the City of New York 10 (1961).
103. See id. See Sovern Commission Report, supra note 32, at 515-56 for a comparison
of single and multi-member districts and their attendant advantages and disadvantages.
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first tine since the repeal of proportional representation. 104 These at-
large seats were discontinued in 1983,1°5 however, because the sizes of
the resulting delegations of council members from each of the variously
populated boroughs violated the one-person, one-vote principle."c
In 1975 the State Charter Revision Commission for the City of New
York, 107 led by State Senator Roy Goodman, made further sweeping
changes in the city government. Most notable was the formalization of
the community district, which was to serve as an integral, albeit advi-
sory, player in land use decisions through its community board.' In
addition, the community district was to play a crucial role in the coordi-
nation of various municipal services within common service districts
104. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of P.R.'s repeal.
The at-large representatives also served another very important purpose: They reintro-
duced minority party representation in the City Council through the use of limited nomi-
nation and voting. Under this system, each political party is restricted to one nomination
for each borough's two at-large seats, and each voter is restricted to one vote. The net
result is the election of a runner-up, who may gather only a very small vote, and who will
be of a different political party than the leading candidate. This was merely one of the
proposals for minority representation considered in 1961. See New York State Comm'n
on Governmental Operations of the City of N.Y., M Background Research on the Top
Structure of the Government of the City of New York 91-93 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
III Moore Commission Report]. Limited voting has been subject to several unsuccessful
attacks based on dilution of the majority vote, which could otherwise have easily elected
candidates to both seats, and based on restriction of first amendment rights to free speech,
because majority voices are rendered less effective. See Hechinger v. Martin, 441 F. Supp.
650, 652-53 (D.D.C. 1976) (first amendment challenge), affid mem., 429 U.S. 1030
(1977); LoFrisco v. Schaffer, 341 F. Supp. 743, 750 (D. Conn.) (fourteenth amendment
challenge asserting dilution of majority vote), affid mem., 409 U.S. 972 (1972); Kaelin v.
Wardin, 334 F. Supp. 602, 605-06 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (same); Blaikie v. Wagner, 258 F.
Supp. 364, 369-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (same); People ex rel. Daniels v. Carpentier, 30 Ill.
2d 590, 596, 198 N.E.2d 514, 517 (1964) (asserting scheme for electing representatives
violated state constitution because of dilution of majority vote); In re Blaikie v. Power, 13
N.Y.2d 134, 143-44, 193 N.E.2d 55, 56-59, 243 N.Y.S.2d 185, 190-91 (1963) (asserting
scheme for electing councilmen violated state constitution because of dilution of majority
vote); In re Arricale v. Power, 61 Misc. 2d 666, 669, 306 N.Y.S.2d 334, 342-43 (Sup. Ct.
1969) (same). See Sovem Commission Report, supra note 34, at 593-613 for a general
discussion of limited voting, particularly in light of its effect on racial and ethnic minori-
ties and thus its relationship with the Federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 as amended in
1982. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973 bb-1 (West 1981
& Supp. 1984).
105. See Andrews v. Koch, 528 F. Supp. 246 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (order granting interim
relief), a]j'd, 688 F.2d 815 (2d Cir.), affd sub nom. Giacobbe v. Andrews, 459 U.S. 801
(1982). The members left office at midnight on June 22, 1983, the day on which the
Sovern Commission Report, supra note 32, was presented to the Mayor and the City
Clerk.
106. See Andrews v. Koch, 528 F. Supp. 246, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), af'd, 688 F.2d
815 (2d Cir.), affid sub nom. Giacobbe v. Andrews, 459 U.S. 801 (1982). The 1961 re-
searchers were aware that giving each borough two seats would give disproportionate
representation to the smaller boroughs, but they hoped that population shifts would ame-
liorate this problem. See III Moore Commission Report, supra note 104, at 80.
107. See State Charter Revision Comm'n for N.Y. City, Preliminary Recommenda-
tions of the State Charter Revision Commission for New York City (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Goodman Commission Report].
108. See id. at 116-18.
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which were to be coterminous with community district boundaries. 0 9
This decentralization 1 ° of land use decisionmaking did not, however, di-
minish the authority of the Board of Estimate or the Borough Presidents:
In order to coordinate decisionmaking with the community boards and
the City Planning Commission, the Goodman Commission gave the
Board of Estimate "final authority respecting the use, development and
improvement of city land [and] authority to approve standards, scopes
and final designs of capital projects." ''
In fact, although the Goodman Commission had ample opportunity to
revamp the Board of Estimate when it was evaluating the rest of the City
Charter, it instead drafted a paean to the Board and its unique structure:
[T]he Board of Estimate is a valuable and unique institution of City
government that should be continued.
The Board of Estimate is well structured to make important political
decisions and to resolve conflicts between City-wide and local interests.
Its eight members include the most powerful City-wide officials, each
publicly elected by a diversified constituency. Their combined voices
represent a broad consensus, and the Board's relatively small size en-
ables it to act more decisively than the City Council. Its mixture of
City-wide and borough officials provides a balanced perspective.
The nature of the Board of Estimate has been shaped by special
needs which have arisen during particular times in the City's history.
Specifically, it has been a magnet for issues that require deliberative
judgments in the best interests of the City as a whole, and it has repeat-
edly been assigned responsibility for sensitive matters (e.g., franchises,
consultant contracts, etc.) that have not been adequately handled by
other bodies or officials.
.. . The Board is not a body devised by esoteric social scientists, but
rather an institution forged from the singular historical development
and attributes of New York City and its distinct geographic parts. 112
In addition to transferring final authority over land use decisions to
the Board, and through it to the Borough Presidents and top three City
officials, the 1975 charter revisions also strengthened the "borough
boards."'1 3 These boards consisted of the Borough President and the
council members elected at-large or from districts of that borough." 14 In
1975, membership was increased to include the chairs of the community
109. See Fowler, Community Board Wrap-Up, reprinted in 6 New York Affairs 7
(1980); "The Effectiveness of New York City's Community Boards," in Sovern Commis-
sion Report, supra note 32, at 801-37; League of Women Voters of N.Y. City, You and
Your Community Board (1978) (available in files of Fordham Law Review).
110. Decentralization of city government was a hotly debated issue in the early 1970's.
See generally W. Farr, L. Liebman & J. Wood, Decentralizing City Government: A Prac-
tical Study of a Radical Proposal for New York City (1972).
111. New York City Charter ch. 3, § 67(4),(5) (1976).
112. Goodman Commission Report, supra note 107, at 84.
113. See New York City Charter ch. 4, § 85 (1976).
114. See id.
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boards within the borough," 5 and the functions of each borough board
were expanded to include coordination with its local community
boards,116 preparation of comprehensive and special purpose plans for
physical improvements in the borough,' 17 submission of comprehensive
capital and expense budget priorities for the borough,''I and evaluation
of local service delivery by the city agencies.' 19 . Further, borough boards
entered the land use planning process by reviewing applications for use
and development and by making recommendations of their own when
such uses would affect land in more than one community district. 2 ° The
Goodman Commission left the voting power distribution of the Board
intact, however, and although subsequent legislation has reduced the
number of votes, the Board's power distribution was not affected.' 2 ' In
1978 the Mayor, Comptroller and City Council President were each
given two votes, and the Borough Presidents were each given one vote.'2
II. THE BOARD OF ESTIMATE TODAY: STRUCTURE, POWERS AND
LITIGATION STATUS
As can be seen from the preceding discussion, by the time the current
litigation was initiated the Board of Estimate's structure represented a
deliberate apportionment of budget-making authority between the legis-
lative and executive branches of government. Today the budget-making
powers of the Board are closely coordinated with the actions of other city
agencies, both executive and legislative. For example, the Board cannot
independently make or revoke a final budget, nor can it add or delete a
budget appropriation without the Mayor's review and approval." New
York City's Charter authorizes the Mayor to submit his expense budget
to the Board of Estimate and the Council,124 and either body may alter
the original budget by adding or eliminating items.'" The Mayor may
115. There are 59 community districts in New York City: 12 in the Bronx, 18 in
Brooklyn, 12 in Manhattan, 14 in Queens, and 3 in Staten Island. See Sovern Commis-
sion Report, supra note 32, at 819-37 (maps of each district). According to 1980 census
figures, 15 districts subject to a 100,000 person population minimum, New York City
Charter § 2701(b)(3) (1976), had fallen below that figure. See Sovern Commission Re-
port, supra note 32, at 47. In light of overwhelming public sentiment in favor of main-
taining the present district boundaries in order to continue developing working
relationships, and in light of evidence that coterminality based on these boundaries was
beginning to show some benefits, the Sovern Commission decided to eliminate the popu-
lation minimum and to substitute a limited procedure that would temporarily discontinue
some forms of coterminality when a district became too underpopulated. See id. at 43-49.
116. See New York City Charter ch. 4, § 85(b)(1) (1976).
117. See id. § 85(b)(5).
118. See id. § 85(b)(8).
119. See id. § 85(b)(9).
120. See id. § 85(b)(6).
121. See 1978 N.Y. Laws 761.
122. See New York City Charter ch. 3, § 62(a) (Supp. 1984-85).
123. See id. ch. 6, §§ 120-122, 222.
124. See id. § 116.
125. See id. § 120(a) (1976).
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veto such changes,126 which disposes of that item unless his veto is over-
ridden by a vote of two-thirds of each body acting together in identical
terms. 127 There are similar mechanisms for the City's capital budget.128
Outside the area of fiscal planning, today's Board of Estimate is a
center of municipal authority over land use. The Board's most important
nonbudgetary functions include the following powers: exercising control
over zoning,12 9 franchises, 130 and sales and leases of real property;' 3 ' re-
vising by a three-fourths vote the determinations of the City Planning
Commisssion rejecting projects sponsored by the Mayor; 132 and holding
hearings on tax abatement applications relating to the development of
city land when granting such applications involves the exercise of admin-
istrative discretion by any city agency. 133 Contrary to the 1936 Charter
provisions, local legislation no longer requires the Board's consent, 134
and the residual powers of the City have been taken from the Board and
vested in the Mayor. 135 Through the exercise of powers granted to the
Board of Estimate, the Borough Presidents play their most significant
role as budgetary and land use champions of their boroughs.
What must be noted after any recitation of Board powers, however, is
that beyond the explicit authority granted to the Board, its members ex-
ercise enormous political influence in the City. The Board's authority
over budget preparation, franchises and land use planning review makes
its members extremely influential at the highest levels of business and
real estate development. This political power is the key to the relation-
ships between the City-wide officials and the Council, and to the control
of the Borough Presidents over long-range planning and development in
their respective boroughs. Further, the Borough Presidents exercise their
power on behalf of their county party organizations as well as their indi-
vidual constituents.1 36 The importance of the county organizations of
126. See id. §§ 121(a), (b) (Supp. 1984-85).
127. See id. In computing the two-thirds of the Board, the Mayor's two votes are obvi-
ously not considered. This means that two-thirds of nine votes, or six, are needed to
override the Mayor's veto. The Borough Presidents' five votes alone cannot accomplish
this; thus they alone can never accomplish decisive budget choices.
128. See id. §§ 222-223.
129. See id. § 200.
130. See id. ch. 14, § 363 (1976).
131. See id. ch. 3, §§ 67(1)(4), 384.
132. See id. ch. 8, § 199 (Supp. 1984-85).
133. See id. ch. 3, § 67(7) (1976).
134. See id. ch. 2, § 38. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Board's authority under the 1936 Charter provisions.
135. See New York City Charter ch. 1, § 8 (1976).
136. See W. Sayre & H. Kaufman, supra note 6, at 639. Commentators have noted:
The Borough Presidents bring to the Board neither the impressive formal
powers of the Mayor or of the Comptroller, nor the ambiguous potential of the
President of the Council; instead, each Borough President brings to the Board a
consciousness that he represents a county party organization with which...
he ordinarily has close ties, and that he has the formal capacity to claim that he




the Democratic Party should not be underestimated. These organiza-
tions serve to nominate and elect public officials, including the three
City-wide officials sitting on the Board. 137 Thus, Borough Presidents
gain and lose influence along with their county leaders.1 3' The Board of
Estimate serves as a fulcrum upon which is balanced the influence of the
party organization as opposed to the "impetuous tendencies of Mayors
who are more responsive to their broad constituencies than to party or-
ganization advice."' 139 In every aspect of financial and real estate trans-
actions supervised by the Board, county leaders play a quiet but
enormously influential role."4
Given this sizable role of the Board in city governance, it is not sur-
prising that it is subject to constitutional requirements for fair represen-
tation. However, determining the role of the one-person, one-vote
principle, and properly applying it to the Board's unique blend of City-
wide officials' voting majority with Borough Presidents' significant voting
power and direct borough administration, is far from simple. The appli-
cation of the one-person, one-vote standard to the Board raises a number
of issues left unresolved by Supreme Court decisions concerning local
government and the fourteenth amendment.
In 1981 the New York Civil Liberties Union sued the Board of Esti-
mate on behalf of several residents of the city's most populous borough,
Brooklyn. 4 ' Plaintiffs claimed that the voting scheme providing one
vote for each of the Presidents of the variously populated boroughs was
an unconstitutional dilution of the citizen vote.'42 Plaintiffs cited the ob-
vious unfairness created when the President of Brooklyn, a borough of
2.25 million persons, casts the same one vote on the Board as the Presi-
Id. at 638.
137. Some commentators have further stated that
the eight members of the Board usually aspire to renomination and reelection,
or else they hope for other and higher posts on the party or governmental career
ladder-aspirations which, in either event, are subject to the important if not
conclusive influence of party leaders. The ties between the members of the
Board and the party leaders (especially the five County Leaders) in most in-
stances are consequently direct, frequent, and of importance both to the offi-
cials and to the party leaders.
Id. at 644-45.
138. See id. at 645.
139. Id. It has been noted that
[flor the Borough Presidents and the Comptroller, the main significance of
their relationship to the County Leaders is that it strengthens the hand of the
Board against the Mayor. The working alliance has a similar attraction for the
party leaders ....
Id.
140. The Board's organization allows county leaders time for bargaining prior to exec-
utive sessions, and secrecy "surrounds the party leaders' intervention through the Bor-
ough Presidents or other members .... [TIhe pattern is one of optimum arrangements:
maximum exercise of influence with mimimum risk of accountability." Id. at 646.
141. See Morris v. Board of Estimate, 551 F. Supp. 652 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 707
F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1983), on remand, 592 F. Supp. 1462 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
142. See id. at 653.
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dent of Staten Island, a borough of less than half a million residents.143
The district court held that the Board was not the sort of governmental
body subject to the one-person, one-vote requirements of the fourteenth
amendment and dismissed the complaint.144 That decision was reversed
by the Second Circuit, 45 which held that the Board is subject to one-
person, one-vote requirements because it is selected by popular election
and performs general governmental functions.1 46 The court of appeals
remanded the case to the district court to resolve the following issues:
(1) What is the proper mathematical model to describe the Board of Esti-
mate?; (2) to what degree does the Board deviate from the literal one-
person, one-vote formula?; (3) what policies and interests can justify de-
viations from malapportionment? and (4) can the current Board of Esti-
mate be justified by these policies?147
On August 21, 1984 the district court issued a memorandum and or-
der 1 48 addressing the first of the four directives. The court held that the
various mathematical models proposed by the plaintiffs and defendants
were all unduly complex, because each attempted to analyze the repre-
sentation of the boroughs in light of the majority voting bloc of the City-
wide officials. 149 In their stead, the district court employed a straightfor-
ward analysis modeled after the Supreme Court test used in Abate v.
Mundt. 5 While the district court's choice has the advantage of simplic-
ity, it fails to portray accurately power distributions among the Borough
Presidents, specifically because it fails to consider the role of the city
officials on the Board.151
In response to the court of appeals' second directive, the district court
had the parties develop a set of stipulations listing those policies which
the parties contend could justify departures from the one-person, one-
vote principle.' 52 The district court's decision with respect to the consti-
143. See Morris v. Board of Estimate, 707 F.2d 686, 686 (2d Cir. 1983), on remand,
592 F. Supp. 1462 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
144. See Morris, 551 F. Supp. at 657.
145. See Morris, 707 F.2d at 691.
146. See id. at 689-90.
147. See id. at 690-91. In reaching its decision the court stated:
"Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional re-
quirement," and this is "particularly true for state and local bodies, where more
flexibility is constitutionally permissible due to the interest in the normal func-
tioning of these institutions." The district court may find it desirable to amplify
the record with regard to "the particular circumstances and needs of [the] local
community as a whole [which] may sometimes justify departures from strict
equality."
Id. (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964); Baker v. Regional High School
Dist. No. 5, 476 F. Supp. 319, 323 (D. Conn. 1979); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185
(1971) (footnote omitted)).
148. See Morris, 592 F. Supp. at 1462.
149. See id. at 1467-70.
150. See id. at 1475 (citing Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971)).
151. See infra notes 226-39 and accompanying text for a criticism of the district court's
analysis.
152. See Morris, 592 F. Supp. at 1477.
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tutionality of the Board in light of these policy considerations is expected
in 1985.
III. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ONE-PERSON, ONE-VOTE
REQUIREMENT TO THE BOARD OF ESTIMATE
Any inquiry concerning the applicability of one-person one-vote prin-
ciples to the Board of Estimate must begin with an examination of
whether that principle can be applied to units of local, borough, city and
county governments. Next, one must examine whether a local body is
elected or appointed. As an ex officio body,"5 3 the Board of Estimate's
structure must be defined as within one of these two categories." Fi-
nally, for an elected body to be subject to one-person, one-vote require-
ments, it must be determined that the body exercises general
governmental powers.1
55
The Supreme Court provided the answer to the first question in Avery
v. Midland County"5 6 when it stated: "We. . . see little difference, in
terms of the application of the Equal Protection Clause and of the princi-
ples of Reynolds v. Sims, between the exercise of state power through
legislatures and its exercise by elected officials in the cities, towns, and
counties." '157 Thus, based on Avery, it is clear that local units of govern-
ment are subject to fourteenth amendment apportionment requirements.
The next inquiry is whether the unit is composed of appointed or
elected members. This distinction is important because the Supreme
Court held in Sailors v. Board of Education15 1 that "the principle of 'one
man, one vote' has no relevancy" 1 59 to a county school board, which was
neither elected 1"° nor exercised significant legislative powers.) 6' New
153. The Board members are directly elected as City-wide officials and Borough Presi-
dents but serve as members of the Board ex officio. In other words, no independent elec-
tion is held to elect the Board's members. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 163-89 and accompanying text.
156. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
157. Id. at 481 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964)). In Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) the Supreme Court interpreted the scope of the fourteenth
amendment's one-person, one-vote requirements. Id. at 567. See infra notes 320-26 and
accompanying text.
158. 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
159. Id. at 111.
160. The board was composed of five members selected by delegates from the popu-
larly elected local school boards. Id. at 109 n.6.
161. The school board powers included appointment of a county school superinten-
dent, preparation of an annual budget and levy of taxes, distribution of delinquent taxes,
furnishing consulting or supervisory services to a constituent school district upon request,
conducting cooperative education programs, employment of teachers for special educa-
tional programs, establishment of a school for children in juvenile homes and transfer of
areas from one school district to another. Id. at 110 n.7. The Court characterized these
powers as "essentially administrative functions; and while they are important, they are
not legislative in the classical sense." Id. at 110. It is important to note, however, that if a
governmental unit exercises "legislative" as opposed to "administrative" powers, it may
be necessary for it to elect its members, see id. at 109-10, because legislative power-for
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York City's Board of Estimate does not fall within the Sailors holding
because the Board is an elected body. Each member of the Board is
elected to his or her city or borough office, and membership on the Board
is one of the functions of the Office of Mayor, Comptroller, Council Pres-
ident or Borough President. Therefore, the composition of the Board is
properly classified as elective. 162
Thus the Board of Estimate, as an elected body, falls within the scope
example, budget-making authority-"is the essence of sovereign power," Bergerman v.
Lindsay, 25 N.Y.2d 405, 409, 255 N.E.2d 142, 144, 306 N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 955 (1970), and sovereign power derives its legitimacy from the "consent
of the governed." The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). This principle
applies to state legislatures and local governments whose actions "are the actions of the
State." Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 480 (1968) (emphasis in original). If the
elected unit meets this criterion, it will be subject to the one-person, one-vote requirement
of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). However, the court in Sailors expressly reserved
this question, stating: "We need not decide at the present time whether a State may
constitute a local legislative body through the appointive rather than the elective pro-
cess." Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 109-10 (1967). One can infer, therefore,
that because nonlegislative functions do not govern the populace to the same extent, a
body exercising such functions might not be subject to one-person, one-vote
requirements.
162. See Morris v. Board of Estimate, 707 F.2d 686, 689 (2d Cir. 1983), on remand,
592 F. Supp. 1462 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). It is interesting to note that the initial district court
judgment upholding the present formulation of the Board rested largely on the character-
ization of the Board as an appointed body, consisting of members who serve ex officio.
The Court stated:
The Board, however, is not an elected body: it consists of a group of public
officials who are already constitutionally elected to their respective offices as
required by law. No provision is made in the Charter for the election of a board
of estimate. Membership and participation in the assigned activities of the
Board is simply a part of the prescribed duties of the respective offices to which
the designated officials were already elected. The members of the Board are, in
effect, appointed by local law.
Morris v. Board of Estimate, 551 F. Supp. 652, 656 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 707 F.2d 686
(2d Cir. 1983), on remand, 592 F. Supp. 1462 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). (citations omitted).
Furthermore, the district court rejected the plaintiffs' suggestion that the Board is leg-
islative in character. Id. Although a finding that it was a legislative body might have
required it to have been elected, see supra note 161, the question went unanswered by the
district court because it found that "[tihe Charter makes it clear . . . that it is the city
council which is 'vested with the legislative power of the city, and shall be the local legis-
lative body of the city.'" Morris, 551 F. Supp. at 656 (emphasis added). The Court
further stated:
[T]o the extent that the Board has a role with the city council in the budget.
making process which may be regarded as legislative in nature, the Board's
powers "are at once closely conditioned and highly contingent on the action of
other city agencies, executive and legislative. The board is itself unable alone to
make or revoke a budget. . . beyond the reach of further change by others."
The subsequent elimination in 1975 of the mayor's votes on the Board in the
budget formulation and adoption process clearly does not undermine the
Bergerman Court's findings or permit representatives of a minority of the City's
population to adopt a budget, as plaintiffs contend.
Id. (quoting Bergerman v. Lindsay, 25 N.Y.2d 405, 409, 255 N.E.2d 142, 144, 306
N.Y.S.2d 898, 901 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 955 (1970)) (citations omitted).
The Second Circuit rejected the district court's characterization of the Board. The
court of appeals followed its reasoning concerning ex officio boards in Bianchi v. Griffing,
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of the Supreme Court's holding in Avery v. Midland County.1 63 Avery
concerned the Midland County Commissioners Court, which was an
elected body composed of one member elected at-large and four members
elected from districts of grossly disparate sizes.1 Because the Commis-
sioners Court had significant governing powers over the county,165 the
393 F.2d 457, 460 (2d Cir. 1968), and found that the Board was an elected body subject
to one-person, one-vote requirements. See Morris, 707 F.2d at 689-90.
The Bianchi decision concerned county boards composed of the supervisors elected in
each of the component townships. Bianchi, 393 F.2d at 458. The position of the supervi-
sors in this structure was virtually identical to that of the Borough President on the
Board of Estimate. The Bianchi court concluded that voters perceive themselves as cast-
ing ballots for a town supervisor and a county board member at one and the same time.
Id. at 461. It stated:
The mere fact that board members may be characterized as 'delegates' and per-
form functions in addition to their duties on the board, does not provide a
meaningful distinction from Avery. We are impelled to the realistic recognition
that a citizen entering the voting booth chooses at one and the same time a mem-
ber of the Board of Supervisors and his town supervisor.
Id. at 461 (emphasis added).
163. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
164. Id. at 475-76. The four districts were Midland City, population 67,906, and three
rural districts, populations 852, 414 and 828 respectively. See id. at 476.
165. The Commissioners Court had the following powers: to establish a courthouse
and jail; to appoint numerous minor officials, such as the county health officer, to fil
vacancies in the county offices; to lease contracts in the name of the county; to build
roads and bridges; to administer the county's public welfare services; to perform numer-
ous duties with regard to elections; to set the county tax rate; to issue bonds; to adopt the
county budget; and to serve as a board of equalization for tax assessments. See id. at 476
& n.1 (citations omitted).
The Court also examined the possibility that the Commissioners Court was exempt
from Reynolds because it was a special function body serving rural interests. Id. at 483-
84. See, eg., Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112, 116-17 (1967) (Virginia Beach legislature,
elected at-large with requirements that some legislators reside in different districts that
had disparate populations, exempt from Reynolds); Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S.
105, 107-08 (1967) (appointed administrative school board exempted from Reynolds); see
also Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 371 (1981) (large utility district exempt from Reynolds);
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 727-30 (1973)
(election of water district board by weighted voting is restricted to affected landowners
that is exempt from Reynolds). But see the following cases in which voting for traditional
"general governmental" bodies was struck down because it was limited by property re-
quirements: City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 208-09 (1970) (election to
approve issuance of general obligation bonds for municipal improvement); Cipriano v.
City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704-05 (1969) (approval of bond issue for municipal util-
ity); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 623, 632-33 (1969) (school board
elections).
Despite the arguments that the Commissioners Court fell within the special function
body exception, the Avery court held that the Commissioners Court exercised sufficiently
broad governmental powers to require fair apportionment. See Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474, 476 (1968). In a forceful dissent to the Avery decision, Justice
Fortas stated:
Although a mere listing of these authorizing statutes and constitutional provi-
sions would seem to indicate that the Commissioners Court has significant and
general power, this impression is somewhat illusory because very often the pro-
visions which grant the power also circumscribe its exercise with detailed
limitations.
390 U.S. at 502-03 (Fortas, J., dissenting). Justice Fortas cited the following specific ex-
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Court concluded: "Our decision today is ... that units with general
governmental powers over an entire geographic area [are] not [to] be ap-
portioned among single-member districts of substantially unequal
population.""'
One year later-and just one year prior to a broader and more defini-
tive statement of the Avery holding 167-the New York Court of Appeals
applied the Avery holding to a question almost identical to the question at
hand today: Does the New York City Board of Estimate unconstitution-
ally exercise legislative powers, particularly budget-making powers,
while being composed of representatives of widely disparate district [bor-
ough] populations? 6 ' In Bergerman v. Lindsay, 9 the court of appeals
in 1969 held that the Board of Estimate is not subject to one-person, one-
vote requirements because it does not exercise "'general governmental
powers over the entire geographic area.' ,,170 The Bergerman court inter-
preted the Avery "general governmental powers" requirement very nar-
rowly, believing that it must encompass all essential governmental
functions. The court stated:
This is something different from a test measured by legislative powers
alone. In pure theory, at least, the typical legislative body in the
United States does not normally exercise "general governmental pow-
ers." Indeed the concept of separation of powers negates the exercise
by any one branch of "general governmental powers." Normally only
governments with parliamentary executives come close to this theoreti-
cal merger. 171
amples: The Commissioners Court could not levy a tax in excess of 80€ on $100 property
valuation; it could not issue any bond without submitting it to the qualified property-
taxpaying voters of the county; in practice, it was primarily concerned with rural roads; it
had no control over the numerous departments headed by officials elected directly by
county voters, including the Assessor and Collector of Taxes, the County Attorney, the
Sheriff, the Treasurer, the County Clerk and the County Surveyor. Id. at 503-05.
166. Id. at 485-86. Courts have declined, however, to apply one-person, one-vote re-
quirements to bodies that do not exercise general governmental powers. See Education/
Instruccion, Inc. v. Moore, 503 F.2d 1187, 1189 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (Connecticut
advisory planning council), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1109 (1975); Davis v. AT&T, 478 F.2d
1375, 1375 (2d Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (telephone company); Concerned Citizens v. Pine
Creek Conservancy Dist., 473 F. Supp. 334, 337-38 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (nature conser-
vancy); Tron v. Condello, 427 F. Supp. 1175, 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (New York City
teacher's retirement fund); Slisz v. Western Regional Off-Track Betting Corp., 382 F.
Supp. 1231, 1233-34 (W.D.N.Y. 1974) (state off-track betting corporation); Wells v. Ed-
wards, 347 F. Supp. 453, 454 (M.D. La. 1972) (election of state judges), af'd, 409 U.S.
1095 (1973); Sullivan v. Alabama State Bar, 295 F. Supp. 1216, 1222 (M.D. Ala.) (board
of commissioners for state bar), aft'd per curfiam, 394 U.S. 812 (1969).
167. See infra notes 180-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme
Court's holding in Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 53-54 (1970).
168. See Bergerman v. Lindsay, 25 N.Y.2d 405, 412, 255 N.E.2d 142, 146, 306
N.Y.S.2d 898, 903 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 955 (1970).
169. 25 N.Y.2d at 405, 255 N.E.2d at 142, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
170. Id. at 410, 255 N.E.2d at 145, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 901-02 (quoting Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968)).
171. Id. at 408, 255 N.E.2d at 143, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
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The court of appeals examined the Board's powers, noting especially
that it does not have final budgetary authority. While it did not com-
pletely dismiss plaintiff's assertion that budget-making- which is the
"essence of sovereign power" 1 2 --is primarily a legislative function, 73
the court stated that the Board of Estimate is "quite unique" 74 in both
"structure and composition"17 and that it "is neither legislative nor ex-
ecutive within classical definitions." 17 6 Another fact the Bergerman
court found to be quite persuasive was that the Borough Presidents, even
voting as a bloc, could neither form a simple majority1" nor override a
mayoral veto.173 The court found that the limited power of the Borough
Presidents to make or revoke a budget did not require application of
Reynolds v. Sims principles, particularly because the Supreme Court had
stated in Avery v. Midland County that its decisions are" 'not roadblocks
in the path of innovation, experiment, and development among units of
local government.' "179
Bergerman might have unquestionably been the controlling case in to-
day's Board of Estimate litigation had it not been for another Supreme
Court decision one year later. In 1970, the Court expanded the scope of
its holding in Avery v. Midland County when it decided Hadley v. Junior
College District. 10 Hadley concerned the apportionment of trustees on a
consolidated junior college district, which was composed of the elected
representatives of eight separate school districts. 1 ' The Court began its
inquiry by examining the governmental powers exercised by the district
to see whether they were sufficient to fall within its Avery holding."a
The Court examined the nature"8 3 and geographic scopel " of the jun-
ior college district powers and concluded that
172. Id. at 409, 255 N.E.2d at 144, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
173. See id. at 408-09, 255 N.E.2d at 143-44, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 900-01 (Plaintiffis cited
Peoplke v. Tremaine, 252 N.Y. 27, 168 N.E. 817 (1929)).
174. Id. at 411, 255 N.E.2d at 145, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 412, 255 N.E.2d at 146, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
177. See id. at 409, 255 N.E.2d at 144, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
178. See id. at 410, 255 N.E.2d at 144, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
179. Id. at 411, 255 N.E.2d at 145, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 903 (quoting Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968)); see Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 110-11
(1967) ("Viable local governments may need many innovations, numerous combinations
of old and new devices, great flexibility in municipal arrangements to meet changing
urban conditions. We see nothing in the Constitution to prevent experimentation.").
180. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
181. See id. at 51.
182. See id. at 53 (citing Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968)).
183. In Hadley, the junior college district could "levy and collect taxes, issue bonds
with certain restrictions, hire and fire teachers, make contracts, collect fees, supervise and
discipline students, pass on petitions to annex school districts, acquire property by con-
demnation, and in general manage the operations of the junior college." Id. at 53.
184. The Bergerman court had rejected the geographic part of the Avery test, stating:
In the development of the Midland County opinion the court noted that the
Commissioners Court of Midland County, Texas, had, among other things,
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[w]hile not fully as broad as those of the Midland County Commis-
sioners, [these powers] certainly show that the trustees perform impor-
tant governmental functions within the districts, and we think these
powers are general enough and have sufficient impact throughout the
district to justify the conclusion that the principle which we applied in
Avery should also be applied here.
185
The Court considered and rejected as unworkable the propositions
that one-person, one-vote requirements should be applied only to impor-
tant elections 186 or to elections for "legislative" as opposed to "adminis-
trative" bodies. 187 Although it did continue to recognize the exceptions
carved out in Avery v. Midland County with respect to special function
bodies,18  the Court stated the following general rule:
We . . .hold today that as a general rule, whenever a state or local
government decides to select persons by popular election to perform gov-
ernmental functions, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that each qualified voter must be given an equal
opportunity to participate in that election, and when members of an
elected body are chosen from separate districts, each district must be
established on a basis that will insure, as far as is practicable, that
equal numbers of voters can vote for proportionally equal numbers of
officials.' 8
9
"authority to make a substantial number of decisions which affect all citizens,
whether they reside inside or outside the city limits of Midland."
This description could, of course, fit innumerable State and local agencies
throughout the country. When the opinion is seen in full text this is obviously
not the test by which the one man-one vote requirement is to be applied to
multimember agencies.
Bergerman v. Lindsay, 25 N.Y.2d 405, 410, 255 N.E.2d 142, 145, 306 N.Y.S.2d 898, 902
(1969) (quoting Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 484 (1968)), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 955 (1970).
185. Hadley, 397 U.S. at 53-54.
186. See id. at 55. The court noted that:
If the purpose of a particular election were to be the determining factor...
courts would be faced with the difficult job of distinguishing between various
elections .... [G]ood judgment and common sense tell us that what might be
a vital election to one voter might well be a routine one to another .... [W]e
think the decision of the State to select that official by popular vote is a strong
enough indication that the choice is an important one.
Id.
187. See id. at 55-56. The court further stated:
It has also been urged that we distinguish for apportionment purposes between
elections for "legislative" officials and those for "administrative" officers. Such
a suggestion would leave courts with an equally unmanageable principle since
governmental activities "cannot easily be classified in the neat categories fa-
vored by civics texts," and it must also be rejected.
Id. (quoting Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 482 (1968)).
188. See supra note 165.
189. Hadley, 397 U.S. at 56 (emphasis added). In Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453
(M.D. La. 1972), affid, 409 U.S. 1095 (1973), a federal district court considered a chal-
lenge to a Louisiana scheme that elected state Supreme Court justices from districts of
unequal size. See id. at 456. The district court held that justices do not exercise govern-
mental functions, which the court described as applying only to "such things as making
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Examined in light of the Hadley decision concerning a school board,
the powers of the New York City Board of Estimate, particularly its
budget-making authority, are sufficiently general, governmental and far-
reaching in geographic impact to fall within the scope of the Avery deci-
sion. The New York Court of Appeals holding in Bergerman v. Lind-
say 190 may be questioned because its interpretation of the Avery "general
governmental power" language is far too limited in light of the literal
reading given that language more recently in Hadley v. Junior College
District.191
IV. TRADITIONAL MATHEMATICAL MODELS FOR DETERMINING
ONE-PERSON, ONE-VOTE COMPLIANCE
In his opinion in Whitconb v. Chavis,191 which considered a challenge
to the mathematical model used to reapportion Indiana's multi-member
state legislative districts, 193 Justice Harlan noted that "'t]here is some-
thing fascinating about science. One gets such wholesale returns of con-
laws, levying and collecting taxes, issuing bonds, hiring and firing personnel, making con-
tracts, collecting fees, operating schools, and generally managing and governing people."
Id. at 455. In a strong dissent to the Supreme Court's affirmance, however, Justice White
argued that judges "are state officials, vested with state powers and elected (or appointed)
to carry out the state government's judicial functions." Wells v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1095,
1096 (1973) (White, J., dissenting). Justice White further stated:
We have held that a State may dispense with certain elections altogether
[Sailors] and we have suggested that not all persons must be permitted to vote
on an issue that may affect only a discernible portion of the public. What I had
thought the apportionment decisions at least established is the simple constitu-
tional principle that, subject to narrow exceptions, once a State chooses to se-
lect officials by popular vote, each qualified voter must be treated with an equal
hand and not be subjected to irrational discrimination based on his residence
[Reynolds]. Nothing could be plainer from Mr. Justice Black's statement in
Hadley. . . .Id. at 1097-98 (citations omitted).
190. 25 N.Y.2d 405, 409, 255 N.E.2d 142, 145, 306 N.Y.S.2d 898, 902, cert. denied,
398 U.S. 955 (1970).
191. 397 U.S. 50 (1970). Courts have applied the one-person, one-vote requirement to
many bodies with relatively limited powers. See, eg., Wyche v. Madison Parish Police
Jury, 635 F.2d 1151, 1158 (5th Cir. 1981) (police juries); Baker v. Regional High School
Dist. No. 5, 520 F.2d 799, 802 (2d Cir.) (school board), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1975);
White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311, 1312-14 (8th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (Indian
tribal council); Seergy v. Kings County Republican County Comm., 459 F.2d 308, 314-15
(2d Cir. 1972) (party procedures for filling vacant seats); Montana v. Lee, 384 F.2d 172,
174-75 (2d Cir. 1967) (same); Barnes v. Board of Directors, Mount Anthony Union High
School Dist., 418 F. Supp. 845, 849 (D. Vt. 1976) (school board); Fahey v. Darigan, 405
F. Supp. 1386, 1390-91 (D.RI. 1975) (party procedures for filling vacant seats); Martin v.
Venables, 401 F. Supp. 611, 616-17, 620 n.8 (D. Conn. 1975) (town planning and zoning
body).
192. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
193. See id. at 144-46 & n.23. The challenge was made to Indiana's use of an arithme-
tic model, and was based on the theories espoused in Banzhaf, Multi-Member Electoral
Districts--Do They Violate the "One Man, One Vote" Principle?, 75 Yale L.J. 1309 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Banzhaf I].
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jecture out of such a trifling investment of fact.' "194 Indeed, the
mathematical morass surrounding the calculations used to assess one-
person, one-vote compliance is an example of inadequate consideration of
political reality prior to the application of a calculator.' 95 Specifically,
any mathematical model purporting to represent a political institution
must first accurately portray the power held by each member of that
institution.
In 1983, the Second Circuit held that the Board of Estimate is subject
to one-person, one-vote requirements, 96 and remanded the case to the
district court, with instructions that the court "determine the degree of
malapportionment present (after deciding on the appropriate methodol-
ogy for doing so) and rule on the policies and interests which the
Supreme Court has held may justify deviations from the literal one per-
son, one vote formula." '197
Neither of these instructions is easy to follow. Determining an appro-
priate mathematical model for calculating the Board's deviation from
perfect equality of representation is complicated both by its unique struc-
ture, in which city-wide officials hold a majority of the voting power,
and by the fact that the Supreme Court has never fully explained what
constitutes equality of representation. Consideration of the public policy
reasons for allowing an imperfectly apportioned Board to continue is
complicated by New York City's relatively unique structure, in which a
municipal government incorporates five county (borough) governments,
and by the history of power sharing and power trading between the City
and its boroughs. 198 Furthermore, the two issues identified by the Second
Circuit are intertwined. The mathematical model chosen should reflect
the real political positions of the voting members of the Board. This
choice can result in findings of deviations ranging from approximately
2% 199 to 1 5 3 %. 200 Public policy considerations may justify some but cer-
tainly not all of these deviations.
To begin, one must understand the meaning of the term "deviation,"
for it is by this measure that the Supreme Court sets standards for one-
person, one-vote compliance. A deviation is the degree of difference be-
tween the representation a constituency should have and the representa-
tion it does have."0' Usually it is measured in terms of population. For
194. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 169 n.5 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part) (quoting M.
Twain, Life on the Mississippi 109 (1965)).
195. For an example of the lack of political considerations in the analysis, see infra
note 225.
196. See Morris v. Board of Estimate, 707 F.2d 686, 689-90 (2d Cir. 1983), on remand,
592 F. Supp. 1462 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
197. Id. at 690 (footnote omitted).
198. See supra Part I.
199. See Affidavit in Support of Intervenor-Defendant Ponterio's Motion to Deem Is-
sues Resolved at Exh. VII, Morris v. Board of Estimate, 592 F. Supp. 1462 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (available in files of Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Ponterio Affidavit].
200. See infra notes 204, 225 and accompanying text.
201. See Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 184 (1971).
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example, imagine a county with 10 representatives and a population of
100,000. Ideally, each legislator should have a constituency of 10,000. If
one legislator had a constituency of 12,000, then each person in that con-
stituency would be under-represented, getting only 1/12,000 of the legis-
lator's time, attention and loyalty, rather than the 1/10,000 that is due.
To measure the deviation, one generally compares the excess number of
constituents (here, 2,000) with the ideal number of constituents (here,
10,000). The comparison is then expressed as a percentage, called the
deviation:
Actual Constituents = 12,000






The deviation is therefore 20%. If two other districts in this county had
only 9000 persons, each would be 10% over-represented. The "extreme"
or "total deviation" is the range between the most over-represented dis-
trict (10%) and the most under-represented district (20%), for a total
deviation of 30%.
According to the 1980 census, the population of New York City was
7,071,030, with a borough population ratio between the largest and the
smallest of roughly seven-to-one, as presented in Table 1.
Table 1202
New York City Population Figures-1980







202. See Bureau of the Census, 1984 Statistical Abstract of the United States 29 (1980
New York City population census). These same figures were consistently used by the
Sovern Commission for the 1983 Charter Revision effort. See Sovem Commission
Report, supra note 32, at 697, 700, 702, 704. Note that the Comission also employed
adjusted figures used by the 1981 New York City Districting Commission and approved
by the Department of Justice. The actual difference between the two sets of figures is
slight and reflects errors in counting. See id. at 431.
1985]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
A. Plaintiffs' First Mathematical Model of the Board of Estimate
In their complaint in Morris v. Board of Estimate,20 3 plaintiffs asserted
that the Board exhibits a deviation of 136.4% over-representation of
Staten Island and 16.7% under-representation of Brooklyn, for an ex-
treme or total deviation of 153.1%."20 Plaintiffs' strategy was to use an
analysis similar to that employed for weighted voting schemes and
loosely modeled after that used in Abate v. Mundt.20 5 The only difference
was that the concept of "vote" was substituted for the concept of legisla-
tor-that is, plaintiffs measured the number of constituents per vote
rather than per legislator.20 6 Before such a scheme can be used, one must
decide how to attribute votes to the constituents. For the votes held by
the Borough Presidents this is a straightforward matter; each Borough
President currently casts one vote for the constituents of that borough.20 7
The votes held by the city-wide officials-the Mayor, Comptroller and
City Council President-are not as easy to attribute. The formula chosen
must not only be mathematically elegant, but must also reflect the polit-
ical realities of the Board-that is, the attribution of city-wide votes must
reflect the degree of representation each city-wide official gives to each of
the boroughs. The plaintiffs' complaint allocated these city-wide votes
among the boroughs in proportion to the population in each borough, on
the theory that each city resident is represented equally by the city-wide
official. For example, Brooklyn has 31.55% of the city population, and
therefore gets 31.55% of the 6 votes held by city-wide officials, for a total
of 1.89 votes.208 These 1.89 votes held in trust for Brooklyn are then
added to the 1 vote held by Brooklyn through its Borough President. In
sum, the plaintiffs contended that Brooklyn is represented by 2.89 of the
11 votes on today's Board.2"
Table 2 illustrates plaintiffs' analysis of the voting power of each bor-
ough on the present Board of Estimate:
203. 551 F. Supp. 652 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 707 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1983), on remand,
592 F. Supp. 1462 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
204. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 6, Morris v. Board of
Estimate, 551 F. Supp. 652 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (available in files of Fordham Law Review)
[hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Complaint].
205. 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
206. Compare id. at 184 & n.1 (using constituents per legislator), with Plaintiff's Com-
plaint, supra note 204, at 5-6 (using constituents per vote of legislator).
207. See New York City Charter ch. 3, § 62(a) (Supp. 1984-85).





Plaintiffs'Analysis of Present Board
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wide Votes
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As Table 2 demonstrates, the plaintiffs distributed city-wide votes among
the boroughs and added to them the one vote held by each Borough Pres-
ident in order to determine the total vote actually held.
To demonstrate the unfairness of the present structure of the Board,
plaintiffs then illustrated the voting structure of an ideal Board of Esti-
mate in which each borough controls a number of votes that is in perfect
proportion to its population.21 ' In their illustration plaintiffs reallocated
the five votes held by the Borough Presidents as if those five votes were
distributed according to population rather than under today's formula of
one vote per Borough President. Under this scheme, Brooklyn would
control 1.58 of the 5 votes, and Staten Island only 0.25.212 By adding a
borough's proportional share of the Borough President votes to its attrib-
uted share of the city-wide officials' votes, one can conclude that ideally
Brooklyn would control 3.47 of the Board's 11 votes, Staten Island 0.55,
and Manhattan 2.22, as illustrated in Table 3:
Table 3213



















210. This Table includes data presented in Plaintiffs Complaint, id. at 5-6, as well as
other data provided by the author. The structure of this Table and the following Tables is
of the author's design. In this and subsequent tables, an asterisk will indicate an error of
0.01 notes, which is caused by the necessary rounding off of decimal places.
211. See id. at 5.
212. Id.


































Plaintiffs continued their analysis by comparing the "actual" number
of votes held by each borough with the "ideal" number of votes it should
hold-expressing the difference between the two as a percentage of the





Borough Votes Votes Difference Percent Deviation***
Bklyn 2.89 3.47 -0.58 - 16.71%
Qns 2.60 2.94 -0.34 - 11.53%
Man. 2.21 2.22 -0.01 - 00.45%
Bnx 1.99 1.82 0.17 + 9.34%
S.I. 1.30 0.55 0.75 + 136.36%
TOTAL 10.99 11.00 - 153.07%
* From Table 2
** From Table 3
Negative numbers indicate under-representation; positive numbers indicate over-
representation. "Total deviation" is calculated by adding the absolute value of the
deviations of the most over-represented and under-represented constituencies.
The "extreme deviation" of the Board from ideal representation is
then calculated by looking at the range between the most under-repre-
sented borough, Brooklyn with a 16.71% deviation, and the most over-
represented borough, Staten Island with a 136.36% deviation. In this
case that range totals 153.07%, truly a large deviation when one consid-
ers that the Supreme Court has not yet upheld a local government appor-
tionment scheme with an "extreme" or "total" deviation in excess of
16.40%.215
There are, however, several problems with this model of Board of Esti-
mate apportionment. The most narrow objection is that it expresses the
deviations in terms of the number of votes each borough should control.
The preferred mode of analysis focuses on the number of constituents
each vote should represent, and then compares that to the number of
constituents actually represented by a single vote. The simple explanation
for this preference is that the latter analysis was adopted by the Supreme
Court in Abate v. Mundt.21 6 An analysis focusing on votes has two addi-
tional problems. First, it assumes that votes ideally should be distributed
214. See id.
215. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 319, 325 (16.40% deviation upheld), modi-
fied on other grounds, 411 U.S. 922 (1973); see also Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 184,
187 (1971) (11.90% deviation on the Rockland County Board of Supervisors upheld).
Compare this with Brown v. Thomson, 103 S. Ct. 2690, 2698 (1983), discussed infra note
340 (De minimis marginal increase in deviation due to addition of one more county repre-
sentative on Wyoming state legislature upheld. Court never reaches issue of overall 89%
maximum deviation of legislature.). For a discussion of the varying standards to which
federal, state afid local districting schemes are held, see Sovern Commission Report,
supra note 32, at 445-59.
216. See 403 U.S. 182, 184-87 (1971).
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in strict arithmetic proportion to the underlying population, an assump-
tion that is subject to criticism.21 7 Second, it exacerbates the deviation by
analyzing small numbers of votes rather than large numbers of constitu-
ents. This phenomenon, arising from the use of small numbers, was ex-
plicitly recognized in Hadley v. Junior College District21 when the
Supreme Court stated that a less exact standard might be appropriate
when the deviation results from "the inherent mathematical complica-
tions in equally apportioning a small number of trustees among a limited
number of component districts." '219
B. Plaintiffs' Second Mathematical Model of the Board of Estimate
The problems described above can be dramatically illustrated when
one compares the previous analysis used by the plaintiffs in their com-
plaint22 with that used in their brief before the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals. 21 This latter analysis is more closely modeled after Abate v.
Mundt' and results in a far smaller total deviation. In this analysis, the
number of constituents represented by each vote on the Board is com-
pared with an ideally apportioned Board on which there are 11 votes,
with one-eleventh of the City, or 642,821 persons, represented by each
vote. In other words, rather than calculating the deviation by reference
to the difference between the ideal and actual number of votes per group
of constituents,"3 this second model relies on the difference between the
ideal and actual number of constituents per vote Except for this single
change, all data and underlying assumptions about the attribution of
city-wide votes to borough constituents remain constant. As before, the
plaintiffs assume that each borough is represented by a proportional
share of the six votes cast by city-wide officials:
217. See infra text accompanying notes 249-54.
218. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
219. Id. at 58.
220. See Plaintiff's Complaint, supra note 204, at 5 (showing difference between ideal
and actual numbers of votes per group of constituents).
221. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 18, Morris v. Board of Estimate, 707 F.2d
686 (2d Cir. 1983) (model showing difference between ideal and actual number of constit-
uents per vote) (available in files of Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Brief for
Plaintiffs].
222. See 403 U.S. 182, 184-87 (1971).






Borough Population Votes Per Vote Per Vote Difference Deviation
Bklyn 2,230,936 2.89 771,950 642,821 129,129 +20.1%
Qns 1,891,325 2.60 727,433 642,821 81,825 + 13.2%
Man. 1,427,533 2.21 645,942 642,821 3,122 + 0.5%
Bnx 1,169,115 1.99 587,495 642,821 -55,326 - 8.6%
S.I. 352,121 1.30 270,863 642,821 -371,959 -57.9%
TOTAL 7,071,030 10.99 - - - 78.0%
* Total votes are calculated in Table 2, supra.
Using this mode of mathematical analysis but without changing any of
the underlying assumptions, the extreme deviation drops from 153% to
78.0% (20.1% +57.9%). This is an example of the substantial differ-
ences that result from choosing a particular mathematical analysis and
from using larger, population figures as opposed to smaller, voting
figures.
This analysis is also flawed, however, because it continues to distribute
the six votes held by the city-wide officials among the boroughs in pro-
portion to their underlying populations, a distribution that is politically
unrealistic. Presumably city officials, such as the Mayor, Comptroller
and City Council President, do not view themselves as obligated to each
of the five boroughs in proportion to population: It is unlikely that these
officials will consciously vote in Staten Island's self-interest 4.98% of the
time and in Brooklyn's self-interest 31.55% of the time. The fact that
these officials are elected city-wide means that their 'constituency is the
entire City of New York, and the interests of the City as a whole are not
necessarily the same as the sum of the discrete interests of each borough.
For example, although no borough may desire a new jail to be located
within its boundaries, the City's interest in creating new jail space may
require that the will of one or more of the boroughs be overborne. A
City official faced with the problem of inadequate jail space is presented
with a fundamentally different issue than that which is presented to each
of the Borough Presidents.
This is not to say that a borough or its Borough President cannot vote
in a manner that reflects an enlightened self-interest and a concern for
the common good. It is unrealistic, however, to assume that this possibil-
ity justifies the arbitrary distribution of votes held by city officials in a
manner that implies that these votes are equivalent to those held by Bor-
ough Presidents. At the citizen level, the Borough President's vote is
more controllable than the vote of a city official who is subject to pres-
sures not only from other boroughs but from the city as a whole. Fur-
thermore, any attempt to distribute these votes among the boroughs
serves to ignore the most unique and deliberate aspect of the Board's
224. See Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 221, at 18.
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voting structure: The voting majority is legislatively mandated for these
city officials on the very theory that their broader vision should prevail
even against the combined opposition of the five Borough Presidents. "22
225. In a memorandum prepared upon remand from the Second Circuit to the Eastern
District of New York, the City defendants argued:
mhe Board's representation scheme is a function of both city-wide representa-
tives (who control 55% of Board votes) and borough representatives. Any
methodology which attempts to analyze the existing representation scheme
must recognize this basic fact. By definition, the city-wide members represent
the entire City and any attempt to allocate their votes to the borough represent-
atives only results in a gross distortion of the Board's representation scheme.
Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 11, at 23. The voting structure that assures that
the city officials hold a majority has remained unchanged since its inception in 1900. See
1900 Report, supra note 45, at 19. For a history of the Board of Estimate, see supra text
accompanying notes 28-135. Intervenor-Defendant Frank Ponterio made a similar point
when he asserted that
[i]t is. . .no more legitimate to divide the mayor's two Board votes among the
five boroughs than it is to divide the Staten Island Borough President's one
Board vote among the towns of Port Richmond, West Brighton, Stapleton, An-
nadale, et aL Just as each borough president always represents the interests of
his entire borough, the city-wide members always represent the interests of the
entire city. Of course on specific issues, a city-wide member may favor the local
interests of one borough over another. Nevertheless, this does not mean that
members allocate certain fractions of themselves to specific communities.
Intervenor-Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Deem Issues Re-
solved at 3, Morris v. Board of Estimate, 592 F. Supp. 1462 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). Ponterio
analogized the plaintiffs' mathematical model to that used for the "shared floater" analy-
sis of floterial districts, and suggested that the "aggregate" analysis for floterial districts is
more appropriate to the Board of Estimate. See id. at 16. The analogy is interesting but
politically inaccurate. The City of New York is not a floterial district or a collection of
floterial districts within a larger political unit employing single-member districts. Rather,
the city is an entire political unit, which is why neither the "shared floater" nor "aggre-
gate methods" is truly satisfactory. Of the two, however, the "shared floater" analysis is
slightly more politically realistic in general.
Floterial districts are "superdistricts" [that] combine two or more component
legislative districts. From this superdistrict one or more representatives are
elected. In addition, each of the component districts may itself elect one or
more legislators. Floterial districts are used to correct representational dispari-
ties among districts which by themselves deviate very far from the "average' or
ideal district size. [Thus, f]loterial districts allow districting commissions to
achieve population-based representation without altering natural political or ge-
ographic boundaries.
Sovern Commission Report, supra note 32, at 569.
If the floterial district analogy is applied to the Board of Estimate, then the entire City
is considered a floterial district with three "floating" representatives casting two votes
apiece, and with five component districts each electing one independent representative
who casts one vote. Using the aggregate method, one calculates the deviation by examin-
ing the floterial district population (7,071,030 persons) and the overall number of repre-
sentatives (11, if one considers each vote as one "representative"), which yields one
representative (or vote) per 642,821 persons. However, this is identical to the calculation
by which one finds the "ideal" or average size of a constituency. By definition, then, the
aggregate method will yield a 0.00% total deviation, as opposed to the 78% total devia-
tion one arrives at by using the shared floater method, in which each component district
is considered to have its own representative plus a proportional share of the floating rep-
resentatives. See infra Table 6. In fact, intervenor-defendant Ponterio acknowledges this
very fact when he states that "since the aggregate ratios for the actual and ideal Board are
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C. The District Court's Mathematical Model of the Board
On remand, the district court recognized the aforementioned problem
of attributing city-wide votes, stating that "[a]ny quantitative method for
analyzing the Board that attempts to allocate the citywide members'
votes among the boroughs is inevitably arbitrary and ad-hoc." '226 In re-
sponse, however, the district court chose not to search for a meaningful
way to evaluate the effect of the majority bloc on Borough President vot-
ing powers, but instead opted to eliminate the bloc's role from considera-
tion of the proper degree of representation to be accorded to each
Borough President.227 It analogized the Board to a legislature containing
one representative from each of five districts and three members elected
at-large, and pointed to numerous cases in which at-large seats were not
considered when evaluating the single-member districts of similar bod-
ies.22 Further, it cited the Supreme Court's "reluctance to involve the
identical, a different measure must be defined." Ponterio's Affidavit, supra note 199, at
11.
Mr. Ponterio is correct in stating that a new standard against which to judge the Board
must be defined in order to use the aggregate method. In the true floterial district situa-
tion, that standard would be the average district size over the entire political unit-for
example, 10,000 persons per representative in a hypothetical county of twenty towns.
However, if the floterial district and the entire political unit are identical, as is the case
when the City is viewed as a floterial district for the Board, then the apportionment will
necessarily be perfect when analyzed by the aggregate method, regardless of the actual
distribution of borough and city votes. For example, if Richmond had 2 votes and Brook-
lyn had 0 votes, with all others unchanged, the aggregate analysis would still yield a
deviation of 0.00%.
This points to the essential fallacy in applying the floterial district analogy in any form
to New York City and its Board of Estimate. Floterial districts are used for correcting
representational disparities in some but not all of the legislative districts in a given polit-
ical unit. For example, the hypothetical county of twenty towns may have one floterial
district covering three of the larger towns, so that citizens of that district may get some
additional representation beyond that of their individually elected legislators. In addition,
while the "floating" representative of several districts on a county or state legislative body
may be viewed as representing each of his component districts somewhat in proportion to
their populations, a representative elected by the entire county or state has a fundamen-
tally different mission. The same is true for the city-wide officials on the Board, who are
not properly viewed as sharing their representation among the boroughs, but as repre-
senting the City as a unified whole. For discussion of floterial districts, see generally
Sovern Commission Report, supra note 32, at 567-92. For a discussion of the mathemati-
cal analyses of floterial districts, see Cosner v. Dalton, 522 F. Supp. 350, 355 n.8 (E.D.
Va. 1981).
226. Morris v. Board of Estimate, 592 F. Supp. 1462, 1474 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting
Appendix to Plaintiffs' Brief, Affidavit of Professor Brains at 5).
227. See id. at 1471.
228. See id. The examples cited by the court were: Perry v. City of Opelousas, 515
F.2d 639, 641 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1975) (five single-member and one at-large aldermanic
district for city council); Latino Political Action Comm., Inc. v. City of Boston, 568 F.
Supp. 1012, 1015 (D. Mass. 1983) (city council and school board to be comprised of nine
district and four at-large members), application for stay denied, 716 F.2d 68 (1st Cir.
1983), affd sub nor. Bellotti v. Latino Political Action Comm., Inc., 104 S. Ct. 5 (1983);
Cohen v. Maloney, 410 F. Supp. 1147, 1149-50 (D. Del. 1976) (eight single-member
district representatives and four at-large members comprise the municipal council); Mar-
tin v. Venables, 401 F. Supp. 611, 613-14 & n.2 (D. Conn. 1975) (ten single member and
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courts in statistical complexities,. absent reasons to indicate that a
more complicated approach is required .... ."" Thus, it concluded
that a literal Abate test would suffice, and that on that basis the Board
has an extreme deviation of 132.9%.A0
The Abate test simply examines the ideal number of persons per repre-
sentative as compared to the actual number." 1 According to the calcula-
tions of the district court in Morris, the "ideal" number is simply the city
population (7,071,030) divided by the number of Borough Presidents (5)
or 1,414,206 persons per Borough President (BP) or his vote." 2 Examin-
ing the actual situation, one sees that in Brooklyn there are 2,230,936
persons per BP vote. To find the "deviation from the norm" one ex-
presses the difference between the ideal (1,414,206) and the actual
(2,230,936) as a percentage of the ideal. Thus:
ideal-actual 1,414,206-2,230,936 -816,730
- - 57.7% 233
ideal 1,414,206 1,414,206
The minus sign indicates that Brooklyn is under-represented on the
Board.
For Staten Island, the calculation yields a deviation of 75.1%
overrepresentation:
ideal population per BP vote = 1,414,206
actual population per BP vote = 352,121
ideal-actual 1,414,206-352,121 1,062,085
- _ = +75.2% 2 4
ideal 1,414,206 1,414,210
The court then calculated the "maximum deviation,"2 "5 which is the
pertinent figure used by the Supreme Court to evaluate legislative bod-
ies,236 and found a deviation of 75.2% + 57.7% or 132.9%.3 7
The problem with this approach is that it fails to take account of the
city-wide officials' majority voting bloc. While it is true that many cases
involving malapportioned bodies with single-member and at-large repre-
sentatives have focused solely on the disparities among single-member
one at-large compose town council); Oliver v. Board of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 1286, 1289
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (board of education composed of five borough representatives and two
at-large appointees). Note that in none of the above cases were there more at-large than
district representatives. Therefore, the analogy to the Board of Estimate is not entirely
appropriate.
229. Morris v. Board of Estimate, 592 F. Supp. 1462, 1474 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting
Boyer v. Gardener, 540 F. Supp. 624, 628 (D.N.H. 1982)).
230. See id. at 1475.
231. See Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 184 & n.l (1971).
232. See Morris, 592 F. Supp. at 1475.
233. See id. at 1465-67, 1475.
234. See id.
235. See id. at 1475.
236. See Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 184 (1971).
237. Morris, 592 F. Supp. at 1475.
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districts, none of these cases have presented a situation in which at-large
representatives have a majority voting bloc. 238 This is a significant quali-
tative difference in the organization of the Board's voting structure, and
provides exactly the "'reasons to indicate that a more complicated ap-
proach is required.' ,239 Furthermore, it is possible to develop a mathe-
matical model of the Board that takes into account the effect of this
majority voting bloc on the value of borough-president votes while simul-
taneously refraining from any arbitrary attribution of city-wide officials'
voting power to the boroughs.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS OF ONE-PERSON,
ONE-VOTE COMPLIANCE
In order to develop a model that adequately reflects the distribution of
power on the Board and describes the flow of that power to the citizen,
one must focus on two problems. First, in order to equalize the repre-
sentation for every city resident it is necessary to examine the nature of
the "representation" to which each borough is entitled. This Article
demonstrates that representation is best defined in terms of the citizen's
effectiveness on the Board via his or her elected representative. From this
will flow the conclusion that it is the ability to affect decisionmaking on
the Board, and not merely the number of votes controlled, that measures
effectiveness and representation. Second, it is necessary to examine the
comparative effectiveness of the five Borough Presidents in light of the
majority vote held by the city-wide officials. By approaching the prob-
lem this way one can avoid unrealistic political assumptions concerning
the allocation of city-wide officials' votes among the boroughs and can
achieve a more accurate mathematical statement of the present maldistri-
bution of representation among boroughs.
A. Defining Representation: Critical Votes Analysis of Multi-member
Districts and Weighted Voting
An effective analysis must first define the nature of representation and
legislative power and then translate it into equality of representation at
the citizen level. This is best done in the context of multi-member dis-
tricts and weighted voting models. Multi-member districting assigns
more representatives to the larger districts, 2" while weighted voting as-
signs more votes to the representatives of the larger districts.24 ' The
weighted voting model is particularly valuable in demonstrating the na-
ture of legislative power and presents a likely alternative to the Board's
present voting structure.
238. See supra note 228.
239. Morris v. Board of Estimate, 592 F. Supp. 1462, 1474 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting
Boyer v. Gardener, 540 F. Supp. 624, 628 (D.N.H. 1982)).
240. See Sovern Commission Report, supra note 32, at 531-32, 535.
241. See id. at 618.
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The one-person, one-vote principle of the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause requires each citizen to have equal voting
strength.2 42  Unfortunately, despite its variety of explanations, the
Supreme Court has never clearly defined the "voting strength" to be
equalized. Where application of one-person, one-vote is limited to single
member districting, clearly the solution is to equalize the population of
the districts.243 A specific definition of "voting strength" is unnecessary
because each citizen gets the same degree of "representation," regardless
of the meaning of that term.
The situation is quite different when weighted voting or multi-member
districting is used to equalize the voting strength of citizens residing in
districts that vary in population. 2 " These techniques are "intended to
compensate for the dilution of the voting strength of citizens in the larger
district."245 However, to decide how many extra legislators or votes-in
other words, how much extra voting strength-the district must have, it
is necessary first to define the "voting strength" to be equalized. Tradi-
tionally, legislatures and courts have equalized the constituency to which
each representative is responsible."z ' This is intended to equalize each
citizen's opportunity to affect the election of a candidate, and thus equal-
ize each citizen's effect on governmental decisions. For example, with
multi-member districting an arithmetic model results in five representa-
tives for a 50,000-person District A and two representatives for a 20,000-
person District B. With arithmetic weighted voting, District A's one
representative would cast five votes, while District B's representative
would cast two. This model is intuitively fair; for every 10,000 persons
there is one legislative vote or one representative. The model employs
the same perception of equal voting strength implicit in apportionment
242. The phrase "one-person, one-vote" seems to imply this interpretation. See Wes-
berry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) ("one man's vote. . . is to be worth as much as
another's"); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) ("each citizen [must] have an
equally effective voice in the election of members of his state legislature"); cf. Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (one-person, one-vote principle derived from the
Constitution).
243. Cf. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971) (While mathematical exactness in
apportionment is not required, apportionment "must be based on the general principle on
population equality.").
244. Although the election of legislators from single- or multi-member districts has
long been the custom, weighted voting was seriously considered in the United States as
long ago as the 1840's, during Kentucky's constitutional convention. Although the
weighted voting plan was not adopted, the following virtues were cited: it preserves sepa-
rate representation for each governmental unit or geographically cohesive area; it mini-
mizes gerrymandering; it prevents creation of artificial districts containing communities
of separate interest in order to meet mathematical quotas; it gives every citizen a properly
equal and effective political voice; by preserving natural communities as separate dis-
tricts, it minimizes jealousy and ill-will. See R. Dixon, Democratic Representation: Re-
apportionment in Law and Politics 516 n.40 (1968) (citing HL Thorpe, Constitutional
History of the American People, 1776-1880, at 107-09 (1898)).
245. Id.; see id. at 531-32, 535.
246. See id. at 617-18.
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plans that equalize the populations of single-member districts.2 47
Unfortunately, this arithmetic model can lead to anomalous results.
For example, assume a four-district city. District A has 60,000 citizens,
District B has 10,000, District C has 20,000, and District D has 10,000.
With weighted voting, each district has one representative with
Councilwoman A casting six votes, Councilman B casting one, Council-
man C casting two and Councilman D casting one. The system is
designed to give District A, which has 60% of the population, an identi-
cal 60% voice on the council. In fact, District A has 100% of the legisla-
tive power, because no combination of Representatives B, C and D can
achieve a simple majority. Thus, only with Councilwoman A's support
can any measure be passed. Furthermore, Councilwoman A can cast a
majority vote even if she fails to get support from any other representa-
tive. Clearly in this situation the arithmetic model has failed to provide
legislative power in proportion to the size of the underlying constituency,
and it thus fails to achieve equal representation for each citizen.2 48
Because arithmetic models for weighted voting fail to equalize the vot-
ing power of citizens in large and small districts, it is necessary to choose
another model. To do this, one must define exactly what is being equal-
ized. In 1965 and 1966, J.F. Banzhaf suggested that voting strength at
the citizen level is properly defined as the chance to elect the representa-
247. This sort of arithmetic model has been proposed, and in some cases adopted, by
many states. New Mexico, for example, established a weighted voting plan for New Mex-
ico's state legislature. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-7-1- to -7-3 (1964), repealed, N.M. Stat.
Ann. ch. 1, § 801, ch. 4, § 79 (1982). The plan was subsequently held to conflict with the
state constitution. See Cargo v. Campbell, No. 33273 (Dist. Ct. of Santa Fe County,
N.M. Jan. 8, 1964), in VI Nat'l Mun. League, Court Decisions on Legislative Reappor-
tionment 80, 101-02 (1964). New Jersey once proposed a state weighted voting reappor-
tionment plan, but it was invalidated on state law grounds prior to its adoption. See
Jackman v. Bodine, 43 N.J. 491, 493, 205 A.2d 735, 736 (1964) (per curiam). Two other
courts indicated in the early 1960's that weighted voting conflicted with their state law.
See Fortner v. Barnett, No. 59965 (Ch., Hinds County, Miss. 1962), in I Nat'l Mun.
League, Court Decisions on Legislative Reapportionment at 1-2; Brown v. State Election
Bd., 369 P.2d 140, 149 (Okla. 1962). One court, however, discussed a weighted voting
plan with approval in 4ictum. See Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes,
228 Md. 412, 439, 180 A.2d 656, 671 (1962), rev'don other grounds, 377 U.S. 656 (1964).
Finally, one court rejected weighted voting because it failed to equalize representation in
aspects other than voting. See League of Neb. Muns. v. Marsh, 209 F. Supp. 189, 195 (D.
Neb. 1962).
248. A similar problem develops in multi-member districting if, for example, District
A has six representatives, District B has one, District C has two and District D has one.
If District A's representatives vote as a bloc, once again District A gains 100% of the
legislative power. This will often occur, because all six representatives must answer to the
same constituency. However, these six representatives may not vote as a bloc on at least
some issues. With weighted voting District A's one representative must cast all six of her
votes either aye or nay; thus weighted voting is an easier model with which to analyze the
hidden defects of the arithmetic model for apportioning legislative power. For a discus-
sion of these problems with respect to the Indiana multi-member districts, see infra text
accompanying notes 207-09. For an unusual example, in which a multi-member district
has two representatives, each of whom holds thirty-five weighted votes, thus creating an
anomalous situation in which weighted votes can be split, see infra note 271.
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five of one's choice.249 This is further defined as the chance to cast a
decisive or tie-breaking vote. 0 If each voter in every district has the
same opportunity to have a decisive effect on the outcome of an election,
then each voter arguably has equal voting strength. Banzhaf's model,
however, leads to the conclusion that weighted voting should increase the
number of votes held by larger districts roughly in proportion to the
square root of their populations, not simply in proportion to their abso-
lute size. 5 '
Banzhaf s arguments can easily be illustrated.25 2  Assume there exists
a district (A) with three citizens, each able to cast a single vote for either
a Democrat (D) or a Republican (R). There are 23 or eight possible vot-
ing combinations, as illustrated in Table 6. In each of these eight combi-
nations, the capitalized votes are "decisive." If a decisive vote is changed
from R to D or from D to R, with all other votes remaining constant, the
election outcome will be different.
Table 6
Decisive Votes in a Three-Citizen District
Combination
of Votes # Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter 3 Winner
1 r r r Republican
2 R R d Republican
3 R d R Republican
4 d R R Republican
5 d d d Democrat
6 D D r Democrat
7 D r D Democrat
8 r D D Democrat
Number of Decisive 4 4 4 Total Number of Decisive
Votes Held by Each Votes= 12
Voter
Of the eight election outcomes in this district, there are twelve oppor-
tunities to cast a decisive vote, and each voter holds exactly four of them.
In other words, each citizen will be decisive in four out of eight, or one-
half, of the election outcomes.
Next, assume there exists a five citizen district (B), in which 25 or 32
voting combinations are possible. Table 7 illustrates the results of the
249. See Banzhaf, Weighted Voting Doesn't Work A Mathematical Analysis, 19
Rutgers L. Rev. 317, 319-21 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Banzhaf M]; Banzhaf I, supra
note 193, at 1311.
250. See Banzhaf U, supra note 249, at 335.
251. See infra note 253.
252. For the model for this illustration, see Grofman & Scarrow, The Riddle of Appor-
tionment Equality of What?, 70 Nat'l Civic Rev. 242, 244-45 (1981). For Banzhals own
examples, see Banzhaf U1, supra note 249, at 34243; Banzhaf I, supra note 193, at 1321.
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possibilities for an election in such a district; again, capitalized votes are
decisive.
Table 7









































































































































































































































Votes Held by Each
Voter
12 12 12 12 12 T6tal Number of
Decisive Votes = 60
In this district of five citizens, each citizen casts twelve of the decisive
votes; in other words, each citizen will be decisive in twelve out of thirty-
two, or three-eighths, of the election outcomes.
Normally, arithmetic voting schemes would give District A's represen-
tative three votes and District B's representative five votes. The underly-
ing assumption is that District A's voters would have five-thirds the
voting strength of District B's voters. But this is not true if one defines
voting strength as the power to cast a decisive vote. A voter in District A
may cast a decisive vote in one-half of all election outcomes; in District B
a voter may cast a decisive vote in three-eighths of all election outcomes.
Smaller district voters thus hold one-half divided by three-eighths, or
four-thirds, the voting strength of larger district voters. Therefore, to
compensate properly, District A should have three weighted votes, and
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District B should have four. Arithmetic solutions, which give District B
five weighted votes, in effect over-represent the larger district. In fact,
voting power- will generally vary in proportion to the square root of the
population.253 This means that if one district is twice as populous as an-
other, its voters have not one-half the power of those in the smaller dis-
trict, but 1/V/-2 or about two-thirds of their power. Thus, at the
legislative level, if District X has a population of 20,000 and District Y
has a population of 10,000, then Representative X should receive approx-
imately three weighted votes and Representative Y should receive ap-
proximately two.25 4
One criticism of the Banzhaf model is that defining "voting strength"
as the ability to cast a decisive vote is inaccurate. The opportunity to
cast a tie-breaking vote is not likely to be the factor motivating a citizen
253.
If there are N+1 voters in a district, the number of voting combinations for two
candidates is 2N+1, because each voter may vote in two ways. An individual
may cast a decisive vote only when all other voters are tied. Consequently, the
number of combinations in which an individual casts a decisive vote is equal to
twice the number of combinations in which the remaining voters are tied (for
each tying combination the individual has two decisive votes, one for each can-
didate). The number of tying combinations for the remaining voters is
N!
(N/2)!(N/2)!
where N. is the factorial (N)(N-1)(N-2),.,(i). Hence the ratio of the total
number of combinations in which the individual casts the decisive vote to the
total number of combinations is
(2)1N.
(N/2)!(N/2)2N+
Using Stirling's approximation for the factorial, it can be shown that each indi-
vidual would cast a decisive vote in approximately i/V2 R proportion of
combinations.
M. Finkelstein, Quantitative Methods in Law 111-12 (1978) (footnote omitted).
254. The ano m'alous results which occur when an arithmetic model is used to calculate
weighted voting can further be illustrated by examining the Nassau County Board of
Supervisors in 'the year 1964. See Banzhaf II, supra note 249, at 339. That Board is com-
posed of one supervisor from each of the major localities in the county, except that
Hempstead, with over half the county's population, has two supervisors. See id. To com-
pensate for population disparities among these localities, each supervisor was given one
vote for every 10,000 persons in his or her locality. The net computer analysis, however,
revealed the startling result that the supervisors of the three largest localities held 100%
of the power, while the three other localities held no power at all to affect legislative
decisions. For sources of the computer analyses, see infra note 298.
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to vote.255 More likely, the motivation is the opportunity to help a candi-









Hempstead (No. 1) 728,625 31 16
Hempstead (No.2) 31 16
North Hempstead 213,225 21 0
Oyster Bay 285,545 28 16
Glen Cove 22,752 2 0
Long Beach 25,654 2 0
Id. at 339. Note that these drastic results are not found in larger legislative bodies. Com-
pare the figures for New Jersey's once proposed weighted voting state senatorial reappor-
tionment, calculated and presented by Banzhaf:

































































































Id. at 336. As can be seen in this table, power shares do not deviate more than 1 I% from
their "ideal" or percentage of total state population. However, if the representatives cast
weighted votes in their small committees, then the undue power given to larger districts is
once again quite out of proportion with their population. If, on the other hand, represent-
atives each cast one vote when in committee, then larger districts are under-represented
at the committee level.
255. See M. Finkelstein, supra note 253, at 112. Note that at the legislative level,
Banzhaf's assumption may well be valid. On a small council, tie-breaking opportunities
will be more frequent. Therefore, a decisive vote is of relatively more value to the legisla-


























date to win by adding another vote. Seen in terms of a utility theory, a
voter would put a lower value on his remote chance to break a tie than he
would on his right to vote altogether.256 While tiebreaking is clearly part
of each vote's value, it is equally clear that it is not its entire worth.
This criticism, while valid, does not lead to abandoning Banzhaf s con-
clusion that traditional multi-member and weighted voting schemes over-
represent larger districts. In his analysis of these schemes, M.O. Finkel-
stein, teacher of legal statistics, suggests that a voter in a larger district
feels his vote is less meaningful because any result will be carried by a
larger number of votes, thus making his contribution less significant -7
This perception is correct; over a run of elections, the variations in votes
cast-the winning pluralities-will be larger in more populous districts,
even if the districts are identical in all but size. Thus the voter is correct
that in a larger district his vote is more frequently buried in large plurali-
ties, reducing its contribution to the election of his candidate. However,
the probability of any given plurality in a larger district is not twice its
probability in a district half its size. In fact, that probability ratio is less
than /2:l1,2s8 which suggests that Banzhaf's model is actually somewhat
overcautious in its protection of larger districts. Certainly, weighted vot-
ing in proportion to anything greater than the square root of the popula-
tion, as with the arithmetic model often used, is unwarranted by the
"equal voting strength" standard.
This analysis of critical or decisive votes is even clearer at the legisla-
tive level, where the power to affect the outcome of any given vote is
evidence of legislative effectiveness." 9 Thus, if a citizen's "representa-
tion" is to be measured by the effectiveness of his legislator, then one
might well conclude that for every given number of constituents there
should be a given number of critical votes held by each legislator.260 The
number of weighted votes held by each legislator will probably not be the
same as the number of critical votes held. Thus, for example, if a county
has three towns of 500, 400 and 200 persons respectively, the town super-
visors sitting on the county board should have weighted votes that gener-
ate multiples of five, four and two critical votes respectively.
Of course, this model also has a flaw: It neglects the nonvoting func-
tions of the legislator. As one court asked when faced with a weighted
voting scheme in which one legislator had nine times as many votes as
another: Is the former legislator
permitted to make 9 times as many speeches, 9 times as many tele-
phone calls and have 9 times as much patronage? When they serve on
a committee together, does one legislator have 9 times as much power
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. A formal derivation can be found id. at 114-16, reprinted in Sovern Commission
Report, supra note 32, at 634-36.
259. See Banzhaf H, supra note 181, at 328.
260. See id. at 328-35.
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on that committee? If the weighted system is not followed on Commit-
tee assignments then the disproportion which reapportionment seeks
to correct is only partially corrected. If it is, meaningful representation
by those who cast a small number of votes is lost.2 61
B. Critical Votes Analysis and Weighted Voting in the New York
Courts
Despite this flaw, however, this form of weighted voting, which uses
the Banzhaf analysis of critical votes, has been accepted by the courts of
New York,262 a state in which counties have traditionally been governed
by boards of supervisors composed of one supervisor from each town,
regardless of population.263 To meet one-person, one-vote requirements,
many of New York's counties have chosen to use weighted voting.264 In
lannucci v. Board of Supervisors265 New York's Court of Appeals ruled
that these weighted voting schemes must be judged by whether each leg-
islator's "power share" as calculated by the Banzhaf model, rather than
his "weight" share as calculated by arithmetic models, is proportional to
his or her town's population.266 In fact, the court stated that a county
should use a computer consultant to calculate these theoretical power
shares accurately.267
The New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed its lannucci decision in
1973, when Nassau County reapportionment was once again challenged
in Franklin v. Krause.26' Although the court again held that weighted
voting is not per se unconstitutional for local government units, 269 it
found that New York does not require a statistical analysis of power
261. Morris v. Board of Supervisors, 50 Misc. 2d 929, 933, 273 N.Y.S.2d 453, 456-57
(Sup. Ct. 1966).
262. See, eg., Franklin v. Krause, 32 N.Y.2d 234, 236-37, 298 N.E.2d 68, 69, 344
N.Y.S.2d 885, 887 (1973), appeal dismissed, 415 U.S. 904 (1974); lannucci v. Board of
Supervisors, 20 N.Y.2d 244, 251, 229 N.E.2d 195, 198, 282 N.Y.S.2d 502, 507 (1967).
263. See N.Y. Const. art. IX, § l(a), (b), (h); Johnson, An Analysis of Weighted Voting
as Used in Reapportionment of County Governments in New York State, 34 Alb. L. Rev. 1,
4 (1969).
264. See generally Johnson, supra note 263, at 16-38 (describing weighted voting plans
of various counties).
265. 20 N.Y.2d 244, 229 N.E.2d 195, 282 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1967).
266. See id. at 252, 229 N.E.2d at 199, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
267. See id. at 252-53, 229 N.E.2d at 199, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 508-09.
268. 32 N.Y.2d 234, 298 N.E.2d 68, 344 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1973), appeal dismissed, 415
U.S. 904 (1974).
269. See id. at 240 & n.1, 298 N.E.2d at 71 & n.1, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 890 & n.I. In
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 379 U.S. 986,
afl'd, 382 U.S. 4 (1965), vacated in part as moot, 384 U.S. 887 (1966) (not vacated as to
constitutionality of fractional voting), a federal district court held that a fractional voting
system is unconstitutional at the state legislative level. See id. at 924. Under this court's
analysis, weighted voting, which is simply fractional voting with whole numbers, see infra
text accompanying notes 280-82, would also be held unconstitutional. However, the court
expressly reserved the question of the constitutionality of weighted and fractional voting
for government organs below the state level. See id. at 924 n.2.
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shares either.27° In fact, however, computer analysis as required by the
lannucci court proved to be crucial to the success of the weighted voting
plan approved in Franklin.27'
The Franklin court, and others approving Nassau County's weighted
voting, justify the use of this type of weighted voting by noting that a
small board is the most efficient form of county government-23 2 Further-
more, separate representation for each governmental unit- whether city,
town or village-is desirable. Citing the recent line of Supreme Court
cases allowing more flexibility in representative government for local
bodies,27 3 the court concluded that weighted voting is a sensible way to
meet both these goals as well as the Reynolds one-person, one-vote re-
quirement for equal voting strength.274
270. Franklin, 32 N.Y.2d at 242, 298 N.E.2d at 72, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
271. See id. at 242, 298 N.E.2d at 72-73, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 891-92. The Nassau County
Board of Supervisors posed a unique problem. Because Hempstead contained over half
the population of Nassau County, any weighted voting plan ostensibly giving it a com-
mensurate power share would in fact allow it to pass any measure by a simple majority.
The plan approved by the Franklin court set a "simple" majority at 71 votes (instead of
66) and a two-thirds majority at 92 votes (instead of 87) to eliminate this problem. See Id.
at 237, 298 N.E.2d at 69-70, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 888. The distribution of population, votes
and power shares are presented in the following table:
Nassau County
% of County Power % Deviation*
Town Population Votes Share From Ideal
Hempstead 56.6 35+35** 55.00*** - 1.6
Oyster Bay 23.0 32 20.30 -2.7
North Hempstead 16.5 23 13.00 -3.5
Long Beach 2.3 3 5.60 +3.3
Glen Cove 1.8 2 5.60 +3.8
See id. at 237, 298 N.E.2d at 69, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
*This represents deviation from an "ideal" power share identical to the town's percent-
age of the total county population. Minus signs indicate a lower power share than the
town's population would dictate; plus signs indicate a higher power share.
**Hempstead has two supervisors, each able to cast 35 votes, for a total of 70 votes for
the town.
***Commentators claim that because Hempstead's two supervisors most often vote as
a bloc, its 70 votes are actually closer to a 90% power share. See Grofman & Scarrow,
supra note 252, at 250. See infra note 274.
272. See 32 N.Y.2d at 238, 298 N.E.2d at 70, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 888-89; see also League
of Women Voters v. Nassau County Board of Supervisors, 737 F.2d 155, 172 (2d Cir.
1984) (Nassau County plan, as modified to accord with 1980 census figures, approved
again), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 783 (1985).
273. See Franklin v. Krause, 32 N.Y.2d 234, 239-40, 298 N.E.2d 68, 70-71, 344
N.Y.S.2d 885, 889-90 (1973) (citing Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, modified on other
grounds, 411 U.S. 922 (1973); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971); Kirkpatrick v. Preis-
ler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969)), appeal dismissed, 415 U.S. 904 (1974). For examples of earlier
New York cases rejecting weighted voting because Supreme Court standards were
stricter, see Graham v. Board of Supervisors, 18 N.Y.2d 672, 674, 219 N.E.2d 870, 870-
71, 273 N.Y.S.2d 419, 421 (1966); Morris v. Board of Supervisors, 50 Misc. 2d 929, 932,
273 N.Y.S.2d 453, 456 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
274. See Franklin, 32 N.Y.2d at 241-42, 298 N.E.2d at 72 344 N.Y.S.2d at 891. For
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Only one federal court has had occasion to consider the use of the
weighted voting in a legislative body. In WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo,2 " the
Southern District of New York considered the four alternative appor-
tionment schemes adopted by the New York State legislature.17 6 The al-
ternatives were recommended by Governor Nelson Rockefeller's
Citizen's Committee on Reapportionment, 277 and included two plans
that employed fractional voting. 7 Fractional voting allows each district
to have one representative, but some representatives from less populous
districts get only a fraction of one vote.279 For example, under plans C
further information on county reapportionment schemes using weighted voting, see John-
son, supra note 263. Unfortunately, weighted voting properly apportioned according to
Banzhaf's model can produce anomalous results if subject to even minor but uneducated
tinkering. This can be seen most clearly in New York, where some counties use "modi-
fied" weighted voting, in which a town's weighted votes are divided among two or three
representatives instead of being held by only one. The courts invariably interpret a town's
"power share" as the sum of the "power shares" of its representatives. Thus, for example,
Hempstead Township has two representatives on Nassau County's six member board.
See supra note 271. Each Hempstead representative casts 35 votes. As calculated by
Banzhaf's index, each Hempstead representative holds 27.8% of the county board power,
and thus the courts see the town's power share as 55%, which is close to its proportion of
the county population. If only one representative held 70 votes, Hempstead's power share
would be a disproportionate 88.9%. Unfortunately, the two representatives act more as
one legislator than as two:
[T]he two representatives invariably vote together as a bloc for reasons which
are obvious to even a casual observer, but reasons which had to be ignored
under the lannucci guidelines: they shared common town identity, occupy the
two top administrative posts in the town, are elected at the same time, and
invariably come from the same political party. Thus, Hempstead's actual
power share is much closer to 88.9 percent than to 55.6 percent. The courts
have never acknowledged the distortions in the measurement of power share
which stem from "modified" weighted voting.
Grofman & Scarrow, supra note 252, at 250.
The Court of Appeals has not addressed this objection to Nassau County's weighted
voting scheme. The computer analyst presenting the weighted voting scheme in Franklin
v. Krause, 32 N.Y.2d 234, 236-37, 298 N.E.2d 68, 69, 344 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887-88 (1973),
appeal dismissed, 415 U.S. 904 (1974), portrayed the Hempstead voting share as 55%.
See id. at 237, 298 N.E.2d at 69, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 887. It is not clear whether an objection
to modified weighted voting was ever presented in the case, and therefore it is not clear
whether the New York Court of Appeals has squarely held in favor of modified weighted
voting.
New York's Court of Appeals has clearly held that weighted voting, whether pure or
modified, is permissible for county government, if the weighted votes are calculated ac-
cording to a Banzhafian "power share" model. See id. at 242, 298 N.E.2d at 72-73, 344
N.Y.S.2d at 892.
275. 238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 379 U.S. 986, affd, 382 U.S. 4
(1965), vacated in part as moot, 384 U.S. 887 (1966) (not vacated as to constitutionality of
fractional voting).
276. See id. at 919-20.
277. New York Report of the Citizens' Committee on Reapportionment to Governor
Nelson A. Rockefeller 36-40 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Report on Reapportionment].
The chairman of the Committee was William Hughes Mulligan, then Dean of the Ford-
ham University School of Law.
278. See id. at 39-40.
279. See WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916, 923-24 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dis-
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and D recommended by the Citizen's Committee, thirty-nine and forty-
seven members of the Assembly respectively would have had fractional
votes ranging from three-fourths to one-sixth of a vote.280
Fractional voting and weighted voting are essentially identical. Both
are usually calculated by the arithmetic model disfavored in IannuccL s1
In this respect, both over-represent the voting power of larger communi-
ties. In addition, both skew the distribution of nonlegislative functions,
such as making speeches, sitting on committees, and intervening on be-
half of constituents. With weighted voting, a representative with twenty
votes to compensate for his larger constituency has only one-twentieth of
the time for each constituent's request for personal attention. Similarly,
under fractional voting, an assemblyman representing a sparsely popu-
lated district with a population one-sixth as large as the norm may have
only one-sixth of the vote of other assemblymen, but he has six times the
time for personal attention to his constituents. It was this failure to
equalize the nonvoting functions of legislators28 that led the court in
WMCA, Inc v. Lomenzo to comment that fractional voting discriminates
against more densely settled areas of the state.283
These same concerns for equalizing nonvoting representative functions
led the New York Supreme Court to invalidate a weighted voting plan in
1966,284 prior to the Iannucci and Franklin decisions by the New York
Court of Appeals. That court felt that weighted voting gives undue influ-
missed, 379 U.S. 986, affid, 382 U.S. 4 (1965), vacated in part as moot, 384 U.S. 887
(1966) (not vacated as to constitutionality of fractional voting).
280. Plan C envisaged a 65-member Senate, with each senator to have one vote. The
186-member Assembly would cast only 165 votes, because 39 members would have frac-
tional votes ranging from 3/4 to 1/6 of a vote. Plan D, which the Legislature most fa-
vored, had an identical Senate plan and a 174 member Assembly casting 150 votes, with
47 members casting 3/4 to 1/6 of a vote each. See id. at 919-20; Report on Reapportion-
ment, supra note 277, at 23, 24, 36-40.
281. See Sovern Commission Report, supra note 32, at 626-27, 636 n.13, 637-38 n.23
(discussing fractional voting in Lomenzo in terms of weighted voting and lannucci).
282. If voting were the only important function of a legislator, the scheme of
fractional voting in Plans D and C would probably not offend the "basic stan-
dard of equality" among districts. But legislators have numerous important
functions that have little to do with voting;, participation in the work of legisla-
tive committees and party caucuses debating on the floor of the legislature, dis-
cussing measures with other legislators and executive agencies, and the like.
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916, 923 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 379 U.S.
986, ajifd, 382 U.S. 4 (1965), vacated in part as moot, 384 U.S. 887 (1966) (not vacated as
to constitutionality of fractional voting).
283. See id. at 924. The Citizens' Committee believed that fractional voting did not
lead to the same operational difficulties created by weighted voting-that is, committee
chairmanships, committee voting and the adequacy with which a multi-vote legislator
could represent his constituents. For this reason, it did not recommend weighted voting.
See Report on Reapportionment, supra note 277, at 36-40. One commentator feels that
fractional voting actually under-represents smaller communities because the only legisla-
tor to whom they have recourse has so little voting influence. See R. Dixon, supra note
244, at 519.
284. See Morris v. Board of Supervisors, 50 Misc. 2d 929, 932-33, 273 N.Y.S.2d 453,
456-57 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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ence to the multi-vote legislator, because such a legislator will be lobbied
more often, and his or her opinion will have more weight, whether or not
it is more soundly reasoned.23 5 The court concluded that this violates
basic democratic principles:
A deliberative, democratic body should require the application of the
concept of "one man, one vote" within the body itself so that a rational
debate amongst the representatives may take place. All of the personal
attributes and characteristics of the elected legislator, his diligence, in-
telligence, ability, practicality, interest and knowledge concerning
pending legislation should not be frustrated by the weight of a col-
league who may be able to cast 8, 10 or 12 times his vote on any givenissue. 2 86
The federal court in Lomenzo, after finding that these inequities of
nonlegislative functions are crucial, held that Plans C and D violate the
fourteenth amendment.287 Its holding might have been limited to frac-
tional voting alone, but throughout its opinion the court consistently
failed to find any distinction between weighted and fractional voting.
Furthermore, in a footnote to its opinion, the court stated: "We express
no opinion on the use of fractional or weighted voting either as a tempo-
rary device to remedy malapportionment or in governmental organs be-
low the state level. 28
8
Clearly the Lomenzo court perceived its holding as applicable to both
weighted and fractional voting. While this dictum does leave open the
possibility of using either system at the local level, it has led at least some
commentators to claim that both weighted and fractional voting are con-
stitutionally suspect.2 89 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never
considered this issue. The State's appeal from this aspect of the Lomenzo
decision was never resolved: In 1966, following judicial reapportionment
of the legislature and agreement of all parties, the Supreme Court "va-
cated as moot" the judgment of the district court as to Plans C and D.290
The closest the Supreme Court ever came to considering the arithmetic
versus the Banzhafian models of weighted voting was in its 1971 decision
in Whitcomb v. Chavis.291 That case concerned reapportionment of Indi-
ana's multi-member districts.292 Fractional voting and weighted voting
were not present in the Indiana plan, nor were they considered by the
Court. However, Banzhaf's statistical analysis of weighted voting was
285. See id. at 933, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 457.
286. Id.
287. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916, 924 (S.D.N.Y.) appeal dismissed,
379 U.S. 986, affid, 382 U.S. 4 (1965), vacated in part as moot, 384 U.S. 887 (1966) (not
vacated as to constitutionality of fractional voting).
288. Id. at 924 n.2.
289. See, eg., National Mun. League, Forms of Local Representation 16 (1981); Boyd,
Local Electoral Systems: Is There a Best Way? 65 Nat'l Civic Rev. 136, 140 (1976).
290. See Lomenzo v. WMCA, Inc., 384 U.S. 887 (1966).
291. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
292. See id. at 127.
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presented by the plaintiffs to support their argument that the arithmetic
model over-represents larger multi-member districts in the same way it
over-represents larger districts given weighted votes.93 The Whitcomb
Court rejected this argument because it did "not take into account any
political or other factors which might affect the actual voting power of
the residents, which might include party affiliation, race, previous voting
characteristics or any other factors which go into the entire political vot-
ing situation."294
The Whitcomb Court was probably correct; the Banzhaf model is not
fully applicable to multi-member districting because it necessarily as-
sumes that all representatives of a single multi-member district will inva-
riably vote as a bloc.295 Clearly this is unrealistic. 96
Thus, there is still some uncertainty concerning the acceptability of
Banzhafian weighted voting, particularly with respect to nonvoting legis-
lative functions. Fortunately, this problem does not have much applica-
bility to the Board of Estimate, whose members' functions are primarily
limited to negotiation and voting. Regardless of the duties to their con-
stituents in their other capacities, the power of Board members to vote
and affect the decisions made by the Board is the primary power that
their constituents expect to be exercised at the Board level.
VI. AN ALTERNATrVE MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF THE BOARD OF
ESTIMATE
It is clear that Banzhafian weighted voting has been adopted by many
New York courts and counties,2 97 and that the federal court objections to
weighted voting are probably not applicable to the Board of Estimate's
primarily voting functions. Employing the Banzhafian analysis to the
present Board by using the computer program developed in 1983 by the
author and a research associate at Columbia Urtiversity,2 98 the current
293. See id. at 144-46 & n.23.
294. Id. at 146 (quoting Record at 39).
295. See supra notes 249-54 and accompanying text.
296. Justice Harlan noted that the multi-member districting arithmetic model is simi-
larly theoretical and divorced from political reality, stating that the only differnce be-
tween the false simplicity of the Court's model and that of Banzhal's was that in the latter
instance, the "calculations ... cannot be done on one's fingers." 403 U.S. at 168 & n.2
(Harlan, J., dissenting). This is probably true. Because multi-member district representa-
tives are subject to an identical constellation of political forces, they are likely to vote as a
bloc on a variety of issues, if not on all. This is exemplified by the experience of Hemp-
stead's two representatives to the Nassau County Board of Supervisors, discussed supra
note 271.
297. See supra notes 262-86 and accompanying text.
298. The program was developed by the author and Mr. Ates Dagli, formerly a re-
search associate with the Center for Social Sciences, Columbia University School of Inter-
national and Public Affairs. Inspiration for the computer program designed to generate
these weighted votes, which was done in Pascal on Columbia University's IBM 4341
equipment, was drawn from Johnson, supra note 263. It should be noted that the pro-
gram was designed to use revised census figures that were not available at the time the
Board of Estimate litigation began. These figures differ very slightly from the figures used
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distribution of power shares is shown to be far in excess of constitutional
limits.
The key advantage to this alternative analysis is its focus on the Bor-
ough Presidents' ability to affect a decision-to cast a critical vote-in
light of the larger number of votes held by each city official. In other
words, this analysis does not attempt in any way to distribute the city
officials' votes among the boroughs. Instead it examines every one of the
21 or 256 voting patterns possible on the eight-member Board299 and ana-
lyzes the number of instances a Borough President can be decisive de-
spite the power held by city officials. Thus, it acknowledges the majority
voting power of the city officials, and incorporates that fact into its calcu-
lation of the critical voting power of the Borough Presidents. When each
Borough President's power is compared to the size of the underlying con-
stituency, and the resulting distribution of power among borough officials
is analyzed, there is no need to once again look at the voting power of
city officials.
Table 8
Classic Critical Voting Analysis of Present Board of Estimate
City Votes Critical Gross Relative
Member Population Held Votes Power Power Error Deviation
Bklyn BP 31.55% 1 48 8.70% 20% -11.55% - 36.61%
Qns BP 26.75% 1 48 8.70% 20% - 6.75% - 25.23%
Man. BP 20.19% 1 48 8.70% 20% - 0.19% - 0.94%
Bnx BP 16.53% 1 48 8.70% 20% + 3.47% + 20.99%
S.I. BP 4.98% 1 48 8.70% 20% + 15.02% +301.61%
Mayor * 2 104 18.84% * * *
Comptlr * 2 104 18.84% * * *
C.C. Pres. * 2 104 18.84% * * *
TOTAL 100.00% 11 552 100.02% 100.00% * +338.22%
(BP: 240)
Table 8 presents an analysis of the power distribution on today's
by the parties. For example, the revised figures calculate Brooklyn's share of the city
population at 31.67%, rather than 31.55% as stated by the litigants, see Morris v. Board
of Estimate, 592 F. Supp 1462, 1465 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). See supra note 202. The program
and the printouts of the test runs are available at the Legislative Drafting Research Fund
mentioned supra note *. For the sake of consistency, the figures presented in this Article
are based on the earlier census figures used by the litigants. See supra notes 202-10 and
accompanying text.
The research was prepared for and presented to the Sovern Commission. Sovem Com-
mission, supra note 32, at 125-46 (Minutes of the Meetings of the Charter Revision Com-
mission: Oct. 15, 1982; Nov. 4, 1982; Dec. 9 1982). The Commission, however, did not
make recommendations concerning the Board of Estimate, finding that while
the Commission was, of course, aware of the pending litigation ... and it con-
sidered the possibility of need for changes in the election, composition or func-
tions of the Board ... it was the Commission's judgement that it should not
deal with issues relating to the Board of Estimate while these were in litigation
Id. at 66-67.
299. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
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Board. Brooklyn, with 31.55% of the City's population, has one
weighted vote. This allows its Borough President to cast a decisive or
"critical" vote in 48 of the 552 (8.70%) opportunities in which a single
member can affect the outcome of the Board's decision by changing his
vote, and in 48 of the 240 (20%) opportunities in which any one of the
Borough Presidents can affect the outcome. The 20% figure is impor-
tant: It is a measure of Brooklyn's effectiveness relative to that of the
other boroughs. The 20% figure should then be compared to Brooklyn's
proportion of the overall City population, 31.55%. In an ideal appor-
tionment of critical votes, the two figures would be identical.3 'o Instead,
the relative power is 11.55 percentage points lower than the population
percentage. This can be expressed as a "deviation" by looking at the
percentage point error as a fraction of the population percentage: 11.55/
31.55, for a 36.61% deviation. The minus sign in the last column, la-
beled "deviation," indicates that Brooklyn is under-represented on the
Board. Staten Island, with 4.98% of the population, also holds 20% of
the critical votes held in sum by the Borough Presidents, for an error of
15.02 percentage points and a deviation of greater than 300% over-repre-
sentation. The extreme deviation between the most under-represented
borough (Brooklyn) and the most over-represented borough (Staten Is-
land) is thus an enormous 338.22%.
This analysis, too, suffers from the influence of the mathematical
model. Specifically, its calculation of the deviation suffers from the same
defect as that of the model presented in the plaintiffs' complaint: It
utilizes small numbers (here, percentages) rather than population
figures.3 ' In other words, it calculates the deviation by comparing the
percentage of power a Borough President should have with the percent-
age of power he does have. Although this is the calculation used by the
New York Court of Appeals,3" 2 it can be improved to bring the calcula-
tion closer to that used in traditional, simple models of deviations in sin-
gle-member district plans.3" 3
To do this, the total number of critical votes that are controlled by the
Borough Presidents must be examined: Here, that number is 240. Each
300. "Ideally, in any weighted voting plan, it should be mathematically possible
for every member of the legislative body to cast the decisive vote on legislation
in the same ratio which the population of his constituency bears to the total
population. Only then would a member representing 5% of the population
have, at least in theory, the same voting power (5%) under a weighted voting
plan as he would have in a legislative body which did not use weighted voting-
e.g., as a member of a 20-member body with each member entitled to cast a
single vote. This is what is meant by the one-man, one-vote principle as applied
to weighted voting plans for municipal governments.
Iannucci v. Board of Supervisors, 20 N.Y.2d 244, 252, 229 N.E.2d 195, 199, 282
N.Y.S.2d 502, 508 (1967).
301. See supra notes 218-25 and accompanying text.
302. See Iannucci v. Board of Supervisors, 20 N.Y.2d 244, 252, 229 N.E.2d 195, 199,
282 N.Y.S.2d 502, 508 (1967).
303. See Sovern Commission Report, supra note 32, at 517-21.
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of those critical votes should represent equipopulous groupings of citi-
zens. As there are 7,071,030 persons in New York,301 each critical vote
should ideally represent 7,071,030/240 or 29,463 persons per critical
vote. Next, the number of persons actually represented by the critical
votes controlled by each Borough President should be examined. For ex-
ample, Brooklyn has a population of 2,230,936305 and the Brooklyn Bor-
ough President holds 48 critical votes, for an average of 46,477 Brooklyn
residents per critical vote held by their representative on the Board. Ob-
viously this is an example of under-representation, the degree of which
can be calculated by comparing the ideal population per critical vote
with the actual population per critical vote, and expressing the difference
as a percentage of the ideal population.
Actual Brooklyn Population Per Critical Vote = 46,477





Brooklyn, therefore, is 57.7% under-represented on the present Board.
Similarly, Staten Island's 352,121 residents have a Borough President
who controls 48 critical votes, for an average of 7,336 persons per critical
vote, or a deviation of 75.10% over-representation.30 6
Table 9




Votes Critical Per Critical Per Critical
Member Population Held Votes Vote Vote Deviation
Bklyn BP 2,230,936 1 48 29,463 46,477 -57.75%
Qns BP 1,891,325 1 48 29,463 39,403 -33.74%
Man. BP 1,427,533 1 48 29,463 29,470 -00.94%
Bnx BP 1,169,115 1 48 29,463 24,357 +17.33%
S.I. BP 352,121 1 48 29,463 7,336 +75.10%
Mayor 7,071,030 2 104 *
Cmptlr. 7,071,030 2 104 * * *
C.C. Pres. 7,071,030 2 104 * * *
TOTAL * 11 552 * * 132,85%(BP: 240)
Table 9 calculates the deviations for each borough, using this modified
method. As can be seen, Brooklyn is the most under-represented bor-
304. See supra text accompanying note 202.
305. See supra text accompanying note 202.
306. 29,463-7,336 = 22,127.
22,127/29,463 = approx. 75.10%.
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ough, and Staten Island the most over-represented. The total deviation
of the present Board is thus 132.85%.
It may not be intuitively obvious why two mathematical models em-
ploying the same perceptions of political reality-that city-wide officials'
votes cannot be arbitrarily distributed among Borough Presidents and
that power on the Board is best measured by one's ability to cast a deci-
sive or "critical" vote-can result in different mathematical degrees of
malapportionment. It is the result of the same problem that crops up in
plaintiffs' analysis as first presented in their complaint: By focusing on
small numbers, one can inadvertently exacerbate the deviation."0 7
In fact, both forms of calculation are aimed at answering the same
question: Does every person have an equally effective voice? In other
words, in a city of 7,071,030 persons, each person should control
1/7,071,030 of all the critical votes available to the five Borough Presi-
dents. To this extent, both the classic and the modified models are identi-
cal. The only difference between the two is the manner in which one
calculates the degree to which present voting schemes differ from this
ideal. The classic method states that Brooklyn's 2,230,936 residents rep-
resent 31.55% of the City population and should have 31.55% of the
critical votes held by Borough Presidents, rather than the mere 20% they
now have. This is the same as saying that there ought to be 29,463
Brooklyn residents per critical vote held by the Borough President,
rather than the 46,477 residents per vote at present. The former state-
ment suggests that the Brooklyn Borough President ought to have more
critical votes. The latter statement suggests that either the Borough Pres-
ident ought to have more critical votes for his constituents or that the
size of his constituency should be reduced. As it is not possible to de-
populate a borough, both statements invariably suggest that the Borough
President needs more critical votes on the Board.
Thus, the only difference in the models is in their comparison of ideal
to actual power. The classic model states that Brooklyn's 20% power
share is 11.55 percentage points lower than its rightful 31.55% share. By
dividing 11.55 by 31.55, one concludes that Brooklyn is 36.6% under-
represented.
But why divide the percentage difference by the ideal if these percent-
ages are just a shorthand for expressing population differences? The real
concern is the number of persons represented by each critical vote. Stat-
ing that Brooklyn has 31.55% of the City's population simply means that
Brooklyn has 2,230,936 of the total 7,071,031 City residents; stating that
it has a 20% relative power share simply means that it controls 48 of the
240 critical votes held by Borough Presidents. By directly examining the
actual population per critical vote as compared to the ideal population
per critical vote, three goals are achieved: (1) examination of the data
directly, rather than through possibly misleading shorthand representa-
307. See supra notes 218-25 and accompanying text.
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tions, such as percentages; (2) a framing of the analysis in the traditional
terms used by courts examining single-member district plans-that is, by
population per seat on the legislature;308 and (3) an elimination of the
exacerbation of deviation figures caused by using small numbers-per-
centage points-rather than large numbers-population figures.
Another advantage to this modified critical vote analysis is that it
lends itself to modeling the political assumptions embedded in plaintiffs'
analysis of the Board31o in Morris. Specifically, if one must accept the
premise that city-wide officials' power can be mathematically distributed
among the Borough Presidents because these city-wide officials represent
the entire city and so afford representation to each city resident in addi-
tion to his or her representation via the Borough President, one can still
use the modified critical vote analysis to demonstrate the Board's malap-
portionment. Although the author does not favor such a political as-
sumption, an advantage of this mathematical model is that it can be
adapted to varying models of political power sharing on the Board.
As shown in Table 8, the present voting structure on the Board results
in 552 critical votes, of which 312 are controlled by city officials. If one
distributes those 312 critical votes among the Borough Presidents in pro-
portion to the populations they represent, then Brooklyn would be attrib-
uted 98 critical votes in addition to the 48 its Borough President controls,
Queens would be attributed 83 of the city-wide officials' critical votes,
and so forth. If there are 552 critical votes in total, and 7,071,030 city
residents, then each critical vote should represent 12,810 persons. How-
ever, if one compares the number of critical votes controlled by each
borough through its Borough President and the critical votes attributed
to it from those of the city-wide officials, one again finds that some bor-
oughs are substantially over- or under-represented.
308. See supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text. Note, too, that this analysis fo-
cuses on Telative power among the Borough Presidents, thus eliminating direct considera-
tion of the city-wide officials' power. This is similar to the district court's decision to
focus on apportionment of power among the borough presidents without regard to the
"at-large" city-wide officials. See Morris v. Board of Estimate, 592 F. Supp. 1462, 1471,
1474 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). See supra text accompanying notes 226-39. However, this model
improves upon the district court's analysis by indirectly considering the effect of the city-
wide officials' votes, because the model calculates all critical votes including the number
each Borough President controls despite the superior voting power of the Mayor, Comp-
troller and City Council President.




Modified Critical Vote Analysis of Present Board/City-wide
Votes Attributed to Each Borough
Attributed Borough Actual Ideal
City-wide President Total Pop. Per Pop. Per
Critical Critical Critical Critical Critical
Borough Pop. Votes Votes Votes Vote Vote Deviation
Bklyn 2,230,936 98 48 146 15,280 12,810 -19.28%
Qns 1,891,325 83 48 131 14,438 12,810 -12.71%
Man. 1,427,533 63 48 ill 12,861 12,810 -00.40%
Bnx 1,169,115 52 48 100 11,691 12,810 + 8.74%
S.I. 352,121 16 48 64 5,501 12,810 +57.05%
TOTAL 7,071,030 312 48 552 * 76.33%
Table 10 demonstrates that even if one arbitrarily attributes citywide
votes to the various boroughs,310 thus ameliorating some of the effects of
the malapportionment of Borough President votes, the Board of Esti-
mate's voting structure still features a very sizable deviation of over 76%.
VII. A PROPOSAL FOR A NEWV, WEIGHTED VOTING STRUCTURE
FOR THE BOARD OF ESTIMATE
Whether one uses classic critical vote analysis to find a deviation of
338%, modified critical vote analysis to find a deviation of 133%, or
modified critical vote analysis with attribution of city-wide critical votes
to the boroughs to find a deviation of 76%, the deviation of the present
Board is almost certainly too large to be justified. This is so regardless of
the strength of the interest to preserve counties-which in New York
City coincide with the boroughs-as the bases of political representation
on the Board.311 However, lower deviations may be obtained by using
weighted votes to correct the representational disparities. Limiting the
possibilities to whole number weights of less than ten and to a city official
bloc retaining a bare majority, a mere 26% extreme deviation can be
achieved if the weighted votes are: Brooklyn 6; Queens 5; Manhattan 4;
Bronx 3; Staten Island 1.312 Table 11 illustrates such a Board.
310. This is not politically realistic, however. See supra text accompanying note 225.
311. For a discussion of the state interest that may justify deviations, see infra text
accompanying notes 320-76.
312. The optimal weights were generated by testing 1500 permutations of weighted
votes, using the following ranges: Brooklyn 4-8 votes; Queens 4-8 votes; Manhattan 3-7
votes; Bronx 3-6; Staten Island 1-3 votes. There were several sets of weighted votes that
generated the same minimum extreme deviation. For example, weighted votes of Brook-
lyn-8, Queens-7, Manhattan-5, Bronx-4 and Staten Island-1 will result in the same distri-
bution of critical votes and relative power as the set 6, 5, 4, 3, 1 used in the text. The
latter set was chosen for its close approximation of the votes that would be generated by
using an arithmetic model. The result is a set of votes that is both intuitively and mathe-
matically fair.
It should be noted that if weighted votes are allowed to range as high as 70 or 80 votes
per person, it is possible to achieve an even lower deviation. Conversation of author with




Classic Critical Vote Analysis of Alternative Board of
Estimate
City Votes Critical Gross Relative
Member Population Held Votes Power Power Error Deviation
Bklyn BP 31.55% 6 84 15.56% 33.33% +1.78 + 5.64%
Qns BP 26.75% 5 60 11.11% 23.81% -2.94 -10.99%
Man. BP 20.19% 4 48 8.89% 19.05% -1.14 - 5.65%
Bnx BP 16.53% 3 48 8.89% 19.05% +2.52 +15.25%
S.I. BP 4.98% 1 12 2.22% 4.76% -0.22 - 4.42%
Mayor * 7 96 17.78% * * *
Comptlr * 7 96 17.78% * * *
C.C. Pres. * 7 96 17.78% * * *
TOTAL 100.00% 40 540 100.01% 100.00% * 26.24%
This illustrates the power distribution on the Board that would result
if the larger boroughs each received a greater number of votes. Staten
Island's Borough President, representing 4.98% of the city's population,
could cast a decisive vote in 12 of the 252313 opportunities in which a
Borough President may affect the outcome of the Board's decision. This
would not disenfranchise Staten Island, but it would limit its effective-
ness on the Board to a figure much more in proportion to its size. Simi-
larly, Brooklyn and Queens would gain much more powerful voices on
the Board. This prevents the dilution of the voting power of citizens in
the larger boroughs. These weighted votes can be readjusted after each
census to reflect the changing populations of the boroughs.
The modified critical vote analysis, illustrated in Table 12, results in a
similar finding for the extreme deviation of such a Board of Estimate.
The similarity results because this weighted-voting Board is very close to
being perfectly apportioned, which eliminates some of the "small-
number" effects embedded in the classic analysis.31 4
313. As seen in Table 11, the total of 252 is the aggregate number of critical votes of
the Borough Presidents.,
314. See supra notes 218-25 and accompanying text.
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Table 12
Modified Critical Vote Analysis of Alternative Board of
Estimate
Ideal Pop. Actual Pop.
Votes Critical Per Critical Per Critical
Member Population Held Votes Vote Vote Deviation
Bklyn BP 2,230,936 6 84 28,060 26,559 + 5.40%
Qns BP 1,891,325 5 60 28,060 31,522 - 12.34%
Man. BP 1,427,533 4 48 28,060 29,740 - 5.99%
Bnx BP 1,169,115 3 48 28,060 24,357 +13.20%
S.I. BP 352,121 1 12 28,060 29,343 - 4.57%
Mayor 7,071,030 7 96
Comptlr 7,071,030 7 96
C.C. Pres. 7,071,030 7 96 * *
TOTAL * 40 540 * * 25.541%
(BP: 252)
Thus, modified critical vote analysis demonstrates that the total deviation
on this alternative Board, which uses weighted voting, is reduced to
25.54%.
It is again useful to demonstrate the effect of attributing city-wide offi-
cials' power to the various boroughs in proportion to their populations.
Such an attribution is by definition perfectly apportioned, and thus ame-
liorates the effects of any malapportionment in weighted votes of 6, 5, 4,
3 and 1.
Table 13
Modified Critical Vote Analysis of Alternative Board with
City-wide Votes Attributed to Each Borough
Attributed Borough
City-wide President Total Ideal Pop.
Critical Borough Critical Actual Population Per Critical
Borough Population Votes Vote Votes Per Critical Vote Vote Deviation
Bklyn 2,230,936 91 84 175 12,748 13,095 +2.65%
Qns 1,891,325 77 60 137 13,805 13,095 -5.42%
Man. 1,427,533 58 48 106 13,467 13,095 -2.84%
Bnx 1,169,115 48 48 96 12,178 13,095 +7.00%
S.I. 352,121 14 12 26 13,543 13,095 -3.42%
TOTAL 7,071,030 288 252 540 * 12.42%
As can be seen from Table 13, weighted votes 6, 5, 4, 3, and 1, com-
bined with the power of city-wide officials to the various boroughs, re-
sults in a finding of a mere 12.42% deviation. However, as noted earlier,
this is a politically unrealistic mathematical model of the actual function-
ing of the Board.315 While the voting pattern proposed in Tables 11 and
12 would result in a more substantial deviation of 26%, it is the voting
structure that comes closest to the perfect apportionment one can
315. See supra text accompanying note 225.
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achieve using either the Banzhafian or the arithmetic model for weighted
voting, if the weighted votes are limited to less than ten.
Although it is generally true that courts focus on the extreme deviation
present in majoritarian voting, it is still instructive to analyze the power
distribution under less frequently used voting conventions.316 Tables 14,
15 and 16 present classic critical vote analyses of power shares on the
Board when voting is by: (1) simple majority without the Mayor;317 (2)
two-thirds majority without the Mayor;318 and (3) three-fourths major-
ity, respectively.319
Table 14
Simple Majority Without the Mayor
City Votes Critical Gross Relative
Member Population Held Votes Power Power Error Deviation
Bklyn BP 31.55% 6 48 19.35% 35.29% 3.74 +11.85%
Qns BP 26.75% 5 32 12.90% 23.53% -3.22 -12.04%
Man. BP 20.19% 4 32 12.90% 23.53% 3.34 +16.54%
Bnx BP 16.53% 3 16 6.45% 11.76% -4.77 -29.03%
S.I. BP 4.98% 1 8 3.23% 5.88% 0.90 +18.07%
Mayor * 0 0 0.00% * * *
Comptlr * 7 56 22.58% * * *
C.C. Pres. * 7 56 22.58% * * *
TOTAL 100.00% 33 248 99.99% 99.99% * 47.10%
Table 14 demonstrates that when a simple majority is formed without the
Mayor, as, for example, on budgetary approval votes, Staten Island
would be almost 20% more powerful than its population merits. Con-
versely, the Bronx would be almost 30% less powerful than its popula-
tion deserves. Modified critical vote analysis yields an extreme deviation
of 55.88%, with the Bronx 40.54% under-represented and Staten Island
15.34% over-represented.
316. See Johnson, supra note 263 (discussing less frequently used voting conventions).
For examples of the application of the one-person, one-vote principle to a supermajority
voting situation, see Pokorny v. Board of Supervisors, 59 Misc. 2d 929, 931-34, 302
N.Y.S.2d 358, 361-64 (Sup. Ct. 1969), and Shilbury v. Board of Supervisors, 54 Misc. 2d
979, 979-83, 284 N.Y.S.2d 124, 126-30 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
317. See New York City Charter ch. 6, § 120(d), ch. 9, § 222(c) (1976) (expense and
capital budget approval).
318. See id. ch. 6, § 121(b), ch. 9, § 223(c) (1976 & Supp. 1984-85) (overruling mayor's
budget veto).
319. See id. ch. 8, § 200(2) (1976 & Supp. 1984-85) (zoning regulation changes).
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Table 15
Two-Thirds Majority Without the Mayor
City Votes Critical Gross Relative
Member Population Held Votes Power Power Error Deviation
Bklyn BP 31.55% 6 30 17.65% 31.91% 0.36 + 1.14%
Qns BP 26.75% 5 26 15.29% 27.66% 0.91 + 3.40%
Man. BP 20.19% 4 22 12.94% 23.40% 3.21 + 15.90%
Bnx BP 16.53% 3 10 5.88% 10.64% -5.89 -35.63%
S.I. BP 4.98% 1 6 3.53% 6.38% 1.40 +28.11%
Mayor * 0 0 0.00%
Comptlr * 7 38 22.35% * *
C.C. Pres. * 7 38 22.35% * *
TOTAL 100.00% 33 170 99.99% 99.99% * 63.74%
Table 15 demonstrates that the Bronx will be under-represented in sit-
uations requiring a two-thirds majority without the Mayor, such as when
the Board votes to consider overruling a mayoral veto of the budget.
Staten Island, however, will be almost 30% over-represented on such
votes. Modified critical vote analysis yields an extreme deviation of




City Votes Critical Gross Rel.
Member Population Held Votes Power Power Error Deviation
Bklyn BP 31.55% 6 32 15.38% 32.00% +0.45 + 1.43%
Qns BP 26.75% 5 24 11.54% 24.00% -2.75 - 10.28%
Man. BP 20.19% 4 24 11.54% 24.00% +3.81 + 18.87%
Bnx BP 16.53% 3 16 7.69% 16.00% -0.53 - 3.21%
S.I. BP 4.98% 1 4 1.92% 4.00% -0.98 - 19.68%
Mayor * 7 36 17.31% * * *
Comptlr * 7 36 17.31%
C.C. Pres. * 7 36 17.31% * * *
TOTAL 100.00% 40 208 100.00% 100.00% ' 38.55%
Table 16 demonstrates that Manhattan will be over-represented and
that Staten Island will be under-represented on the three-fourths major-
ity votes used to overrule City Planning Commission decisions concern-
ing zoning regulations. Modified critical voting yields an extreme
deviation of 40.37%, with Staten Island 24.49% under-represented and
Manhattan 15.88% over-represented.
Although these tables demonstrate some very large deviations in the
weighted-voting structure for the Board, they also demonstrate that these
deviations do not consistently work to the disadvantage of a particular
borough. Further, it is to the deviations presented by the more com-
monly used, simple-majority voting scheme that the courts generally
look when assessing compliance with one-person, one-vote requirements.
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In this case, that deviation is roughly 26%. It remains to be considered
whether such a deviation can pass constitutional muster.
VIII. JUSTIFYING DEPARTURES BY THE BOARD OF ESTIMATE FROM
STRICT ADHERENCE TO ONE-PERSON, ONE-VOTE
REQUIREMENTS
A. In General
In Reynolds v. Sims32° the Supreme Court stated that "[p]opulation is
• . . the starting point for consideration and the controlling criterion for
judgment in legislative apportionment controversies." '321 Nevertheless,
from its early decision in Reynolds to its most recent pronouncement in
Brown v. Thomson, 322 the Supreme Court has maintained that departures
from strict equality of district size for representation at the state or local
level may be tolerated if based on "legitimate considerations incident to
the effectuation of a rational state policy" 323 and on an "honest and good
faith effort to construct districts. . . as nearly of equal population as is
practicable. 324 It has been emphasized that the one-person, one-vote
rule is not intended to act as a "[roadblock] in the path of innovation,
experiment, and development among units of local government."3 25 The
Court has recognized that local needs and local pressures may vary, and
that "[ain unrealistic overemphasis on raw population figures, a mere
nose count in the districts, may submerge these other considerations and
itself furnish a ready tool for ignoring factors that in day-to-day opera-
tion are important to an acceptable representation and apportionment
arrangement. 32
6
Thus, any state or local apportionment that varies from strict popula-
tion equality is subject to two inquiries: first, whether the plan may "rea-
sonably be said to advance [a] rational state policy, ' 327 and second,
320. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
321. Id. at 567.
322. 103 S. Ct. 2690 (1983).
323. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964); see Brown v. Thomson, 103 S. Ct.
2690, 2696 (1983); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 742 (1973); Mahan v. Howell,
410 U.S. 315, 325, modified on other grounds, 411 U.S. 922 (1973); Abate v. Mundt, 403
U.S. 182, 185 (1971); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1968); Swan v.
Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 444 (1967); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964); Davis v.
Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 692 (1964); cf. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 25 (1975) (proferred
state interest considered inadequate); Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 110-11
(1967) (state allowed to experiment in different electoral procedures).
324. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964); see Brown v. Thomson, 103 S. Ct.
2690, 2695-96 (1983); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 748-49 (1973); Mahan v.
Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 324-25, modified on other grounds, 411 U.S. 922 (1973). But cf
Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 445 (1967) (good faith by itself is insufficient).
325. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968); see Sailors v. Board of
Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 109 (1967).
326. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 749 (1973).




"whether the population disparities among the districts that have re-
sulted from the pursuit of this plan exceed constitutional limits." '
The Supreme Court has had relatively little opportunity to address the
first inquiry-to define a "rational state policy." However, one policy
that the Court has acknowledged since its early decision in Reynolds is
that "[a] State may legitimately desire to maintain the integrity of vari-
ous political subdivisions ... .329 The Court explained its reasoning:
Several factors make more than insubstantial [the] claims that a State
can rationally consider according political subdivisions some in-
dependent representation .... Local governmental entities are fre-
quently charged with various responsibilities incident to the operation
of state government. In many states much of the legislature's activity
involves the enactment of so-called local legislation, directed only to
the concerns of particular political subdivisions. And a state may legit-
imately desire to construct districts along political subdivision lines to
deter the possibilities of gerrymandering. 3 0
The Court has applied this reasoning in several subsequent cases, and
has used it to test the validity of State justifications for deviations.33'
Thus, in Swann v. Adams,332 the Court disallowed a 26% deviation in the
State Senate and a 34% deviation in the State House "for the failure of
the State to present or the District Court to articulate acceptable reasons
. . . ,,333 In contrast, the Court upheld plans in Abate v. Mundt334 and
Mahan v. Howell.335 The Mahan plan featured a 16% extreme deviation
among House districts, but the state legislature had the specific power to
enact local legislation affecting a particular subdivision, and the Court
reasoned that such power over the subdivision justified independent rep-
resentation along political subdivision boundaries. 3 6
328. Id.
329. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578 (1964); see Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315,
321-22, modified on other grounds, 411 U.S. 922 (1973); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182,
185 (1971); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 444 (1967); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 686
(1964).
330. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 580-81 (1964).
331. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 321-22, modified on other grounds, 411 U.S.
922 (1973); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440,
444 (1967); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 686-87 & n.2 (1964).
332. 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
333. Id. at 443.
334. See 403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971) ("[A] desire to preserve the integrity of political
subdivisions may justify an apportionment plan which departs from numerical equality.")
335. 410 U.S. 315, modified on other grounds, 411 U.S. 922 (1973). The Court stated:
We are not prepared to say that the decision of the people of Virginia to grant
the General Assembly the power to enact local legislation dealing with the
political subdivisions is irrational. And if that be so, the decision of the General
Assembly to provide representation to subdivisions qua subdivisions in order to
implement that constitutional power is likewise valid when measured against
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 325-26; see Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 686 (1964) ("the state has a tradition of
respecting the integrity of the boundaries of cities and counties in drawing district lines").
336. See 410 U.S. at 327-28.
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The use of politicial subdivisions to justify large deviations recently
reached its most dramatic application in Brown v. Thomson,337 in which
the Court upheld Wyoming's policy of granting each county at least one
representative.338 Wyoming's counties, which perform numerous and
significant administrative functions, were characterized by the district
court as "a major form of government in the State. '339 While the proce-
dural stance of the case rendered the decision primarily applicable to the
marginal increase in the deviation created when a single sparsely popu-
lated county was granted a legislative seat, the state plan as a whole fea-
tured a huge 89% deviation.3"
Other justifications for divergence from one-person, one-vote require-
ments have been cited, such as "the maintenance of compactness and
contiguity in legislative districts or the recognition of natural or histori-
cal boundary lines, ' 341' especially when applied "free from any taint of
337. 103 S. Ct. 2690 (1983).
338. Id. at 2699-700.
339. Brown v. Thomson, 536 F. Supp. 780, 784 (D. Wyo. 1982), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 2690
(1983). The policy in Brown was supported by a statement of legislative purpose, see 103
S. Ct. at 2694 n.4 (quoting 1981 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 76, § 3), and by a finding of the
lower court that the various counties had "different and distinctive" needs, id. at 2695 n.5
(quoting Brown v. Thomson, 536 F. Supp. at 784) and that
the counties are the primary administrative agencies of the State government. It
has historically been the policy of the State that counties remain in this position.
The taxing powers of counties are limited by the Constitution and some State
statutes. Supplemental monies are distributed to the counties in accordance
with appropriations designated by the State Legislature. It comes as no surprise
that the financial requirements of each county are different. Without represen-
tation of their own in the State House of Representatives, the people of Nio-
brara County [a sparsely settled county] could well be forgotten.
Id. (quoting Brown v. Thomson, 536 F. Supp. at 784). But see Chapman v. Meier, 420
U.S. 1, 25 (1975) ("It is far from apparent that North Dakota policy currently requires or
favors strict adherence to political lines."); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 124 (1967)
(per curiam) (no demonstration of "why or how respect for the integrity of county lines
required the particular deviations").
340. In its narrow terms, the Brown case concerns only the differential disparity caused
by the county's one representative:
Appellants deliberately have limited their challenge to the alleged dilution of
their voting power resulting from the one representative given to Niobrara
County. The issue therefore is not whether a 16% average deviation and an
89% maximum deviation, considering the state apportionment plan as a whole,
are constitutionally permissible. Rather, the issue is whether Wyoming's policy
of preserving county boundaries justifies the additional deviations from popula-
tion equality resulting from the provision of representation to Niobrara County.
Brown v. Thomson, 103 S. Ct. 2690, 2698 (1983) (citations omitted).
341. Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 444 (1967). With respect to congressional dis-
tricting the Court has stated:
Any number of consistently applied legislative policies might justify some vari-
ance, including, for instance, making districts compact, respecting municipal
boundaries, preserving the cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests be-
tween incumbent Representatives. As long as the criteria are nondiscriminatory
...these are all legitimate objectives that. . . could justify minor population
deviations.
Karcher v. Daggett, 103 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (1983).
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arbitrariness or discrimination. ' ' 34 2 It should be noted that one of the key
factors in the Brown decision was the proof that respect for political
boundaries had been an even-handed policy of the state for many
decades.343
B. The Board of Estimate Weighted Voting Proposal
New York City's Board of Estimate exhibits many, but not all, of the
characteristics of local government that the Supreme Court has singled
out for special protection from the stress caused by searching for perfect
population equality. While boroughs do not serve as a major form of
government, they do have a significant role, through the borough boards
and the local community boards, in land use planning decisions.' Be-
cause planning is one of the Board of Estimate's most significant activi-
ties," 5 the Borough President can serve as a conduit for rapid transfer of
information between the borough board and the Board of Estimate.
Land use planning decisions can have a profound effect upon a particular
locale as well as upon the entire city,3" and the Board of Estimate has
been the principal body in which such potentially competing interests
have been "deliberately institutionalized."347 Furthermore, with New
York City's uniquely high real estate values,34 land use planning is one
of the most politically charged functions of municipal government.
In addition, there have been numerous opportunities for structural
change during the century-long history of the Board of Estimate. 3 9 With
the exception of minor changes in voting patterns, respect for borough
integrity and representation has been constant, flowing from the original
342. Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964).
343. See Brown v. Thomson, 103 S. Ct. 2690, 2696 (1983) ('The State's policy of pre-
serving county boundaries is based on the state Constitution, has been followed for de-
cades, and has been applied consistently throughout the State."); see also Mahan v.
Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 328 (state "consistently applied policy to have at least one house of
its bicameral legislature responsive to voters of political subdivisions as such"), modified
on other grounds, 411 U.S. 922 (1973); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 186-87 (1971)
(deviation allowed due to long history in New York of maintaining integrity of local units
of government within each county).
344. See supra text accompanying notes 107-22.
345. See supra text accompanying note 47.
346. Witness, for example, the transformation in the local economy of Staten Island
and the financial climate of the entire city as a result of the recent decision to build a
billion dollar teleport satellite communications center and office park. See New York
State Sen. Fin. Comm., Remedies of a Proud Outcast: The Legal Probability and Implica-
tions of Restructuring the Government and Boundaries of the City of New York 21
(1983); see also id. at 14 (the effects on the city as a whole of the land use decision
regarding the Fresh Kills landfill in Staten Island).
347. Kramarsky Report, supra note 6, at 15, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at
A-174.
348. For examples of the relative values of real estate in New York City, compare the
values of New York City properties with the values of properties elsewhere. For listings
of both, see, for example, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1985, § 8 (real estate); id. Mar. 3, 1985,
§ 8 (real estate).
349. See supra text accompanying notes 28-140.
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position set forth by the drafters of the 1901 Charter, who stated that the
power of the Board "to determine the amount of money to be expended
out of the treasury of the city in public work in each borough make[s] it
proper that the boroughs should have a direct representation on the
Board. ' 350 This continuing policy of independent borough representation
has been applied consistently and without "any taint of arbitrariness." ''
While many of the real variations in the character of the borough popula-
tions352 have now been replaced by variation in the characters of the
neighborhoods within the boroughs, 353 there is still an emotional and his-
torical identification with one's borough and with its history as an entity
350. Brief for Intervenor-Defendant Robert A. Straniere at 12-13, Morris v. Board of
Estimate, 592 F. Supp. 1462 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting Report of the Charter Revision
Comm'n, New York Assembly Documents, Vol. 12, No. 40, at xxv (1901)).
351. Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964). It may be argued that the at-large
elections for Borough President are an invidious form of discrimination against the City's
minority population; at-large elections have been singled out for special attention by the
Department of Justice. See Sover Commission Report, supra note 32, at 529-56. It is
true that Staten Island, which is the most over-represented borough on the Board, also
has the smallest minority population. See id. at 433 (10.96%). However the Bronx,
which is also over-represented, is 65.81% Black, Hispanic and Asian. Id. While it may
be argued that the recent amendments to the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973b, 1973aa-la,
1973aa-6 (1982)), which abolished the "intent to discriminate" test set forth in City of
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980), see 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 177,
179, 192-93, 196-221, would now allow challenges to the Board based upon the dilution
of minority votes due to at-large election of the Borough President, the rapid changes in
the City's minority population may make the issue moot. In fact, this issue had not even
been raised by any of the parties to the Board of Estimate litigation until the New York
Civil Liberties Union filed its brief before the Eastern District of New York on remand
from the Second Circuit decision. The brief stated:
[Ihe Board has seldom included minority members. . . . Minority persons
who have served on the Board have found themselves beseiged [sic] by minority
constituents of other borough presidents who are unable to obtain effective ad-
vocacy for their neighborhood concerns from their own representatives. More-
over, the structure of the Board makes it unlikely that low-income, minority
communities will generally receive fair representation, since borough presidents
will continue to owe primary allegiance to the white, middle class constituencies
that nominate them, fund their campaigns, and provide their margins of
elections.
Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment on
Remand from the Second Circuit at 84, Morris v. Board of Estimate, 592 F. Supp. 1462
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiffs' Memorandum].
352. "The city is much too big to be governed as a single centralized unit. It is also too
varied in its population and its occupations. It is also too old in the traditions of local
independence." Kramarsky Report, supra note 6, at 15 (quoting Walter Lippmann, New
York Herald Tribune, April 28, 1936), reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at A-174.
353. The New York Civil Liberties Union's Memorandum includes affidavits of several
public officials and comparisons of capital budget expenditures in various community
districts throughout the city. These are intended to demonstrate that "people living in
Brownsville in Brooklyn are more likely to find a greater community of interest with
people in the South Bronx than with the residents of Brooklyn Heights. . . ." Plaintiffs'
Memorandum, supra note 351, at 48 (quoting City Council Fin. Comm. Chairman Ed-
ward Sadowsky). However, even plaintiffs concede that Staten Island has remained a
rather homogeneous community marked by unique interests. Id. at 47.
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separate and apart from the consolidated metropolitan area."54
Finally, the Borough President's office continues to function as a more
accessible place to which citizens can go when seeking assistance for spe-
cific projects. This role was acknowledged in the 1975 study of the his-
tory and function of the Board:
The ability of the community leaders to bring their problems directly
to the Borough Presidents contributes to citizen participation in gov-
ernment. It is unique to the office that a Borough President, as a mem-
ber of the Board of Estimate, is able to approach the solution of local
conflicts with an intimate knowledge of city-wide problems, policies
and programs. Bringing the attributes of chief executive of his bor-
ough to the deliberations of the Board is a vital balancing force 3 55
These insights are reflected in the testimony heard at the 1983 public
hearings held in each borough by the Sovern Commission when it sought
public opinion on a number of proposed charter amendments.356 Repre-
sentatives of city, borough and community organizations testified to the
relative accessibility of the Borough President's office and to the useful-
ness of its direct line to City government. For example, the president of a
local community school board testified that it has often sought the Bor-
ough President's help
in school affairs, [and] in community affairs as well. We view the posi-
tion of the Borough President as a liaison between the residents of
Queens and the government through his association with the city gov-
ernment and his insight into the needs of the borough, which vary, not
only borough-wise but from community to community. 357
Other testimony from the Executive Director of the Queensboro Public
Library revealed that there are public services organized along borough
lines that seek and receive special help from the Borough President's dual
role.35 ' She characterized her organization as
a very lonely library system. It is one of three in New York City and
.. . we have a real identity problem.
Our needs are primarily financial. To achieve these needs, we have
to hurdle OMB [Office of Management and Budget] at the office of the
Mayor.
354. Interesting to note here is the fact that many subway and elevated lines in the
boroughs, such as the BMT lines in Brooklyn, have directional signs saying "To the City"
to indicate a line heading into Manhattan. For an example, see the Newkirk Avenue
station of the BMT as shown in the film "Next Stop, Greenwich Village."
355. Kramarsky Report, supra note 6, at 115, reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at
A-275.
356. See Sovern Commission Report, supra note 32, at 75-77.
357. Transcripts of the New York City Charter Revision Comm'n Pub. Hearings,
Queensborough Hall, at 58 (Jan. 21, 1983) (statement of Ms. Arlene Fleishman, Presi-
dent of Community School Bd. 25 in Queens) (available in files of Fordham Law Review).




In the city government, which is historically Manhattan-oriented,
libraries and other services in Queens need a champion for their fair
share of funds.
359
In her testimony, the Executive Director stated that the Borough Presi-
dent "has become a voice for the Queensboro Public Library, both here
in Queens and at the Board of Estimate."' 3 ° Similarly, the President of
La Guardia Community College of the City University testified in favor
of the Queens Borough President, who was loyal to campuses located
within his borough, having used his Board of Estimate position to obtain
building funds.36 1
Nevertheless, regardless of how worthy the policy to maintain a polit-
ical subdivision's identity,
even the consistent and nondiscriminatory application of a legitimate
state policy cannot justify substantial population deviations through-
out the State where the effect would be to eviscerate the one-person,
one-vote principle. In short . . . there is clearly some outer limit to
the magnitude of the deviation that is constitutionally permissible even
in the face of the strongest justifications.36 2
The difficult task then becomes to identify that outer limit.
In contrast to congressional districting, which is subject to a stringent
one-person, one-vote requirement based on article I of the Constitu-
tion363 and which has led to numerous decisions requiring near perfect
equality of district populations,3" fourteenth amendment-based one-per-
son, one-vote requirements for elections of state and local officials have
been more lenient: In fact, it has been held that deviations of less than
10% are de minimis and do not establish a prima facie constitutional
violation absent a showing of intentional discrimination.3 65
When deviations exceed the 10% mark, however, consideration must
be given to "the character as well as the degree ' 3 66 of the malapportion-
ment. While it is true that "[t]here must be flexibility in assessing the size
of the deviation against the importance, consistency, and neutrality of the
359. Id.
360. Id. at 82.
361. See id. at 70 (statement of Dr. Joseph Shenker, President of La Guardia Commu-
nity College of the City University).
362. Brown v. Thomson, 103 S. Ct. 2690, 2699-700 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
363. Representatives to Congress are to be chosen "by the People of the several
States." U.S. Const. art. 1, § 2; see Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 13 (1964).
364. See, eg., Karcher v. Daggett, 103 S. Ct. 2653, 2665 (1983) (0.6984% deviation
impermissible because plan was not a good faith effort to achieve population equality
using best available data); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 790 (1973) (districts not as
mathematically equal as possible); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 544 (1969) (failure
to meet standard of equal representation for equal numbers of people as nearly as practi-
cable); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (same).
365. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 418 (1977); see White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755,
761-64 (1973) (9.9% is de minimis); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 737, 740-41
(1973) (7.83% is de minimis).
366. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 581 (1964).
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state policies" '36 7 and that "a desire to preserve the integrity of political
subdivisions may justify an apportionment plan which departs from nu-
merical equality,"3 6 it is also true that "a State's policy urged in justifi-
cation of disparity in district population, however rational, cannot
constitutionally be permitted to emasculate the goal of substantial
equality.
369
Using these guidelines, the Supreme Court has approved deviations as
high as 16.4%.370 Further, the Court has hinted that considerations of
integrity for political subdivision boundaries may be sufficient to justify
deviations up to 30%. In Swann v. Adams 371 the Court stated, "De
minimis deviations are unavoidable, but variations of 30% among senate
districts. . can hardly be deemed de minimis and none of our cases
suggests that differences of this magnitude will be approved without a
satisfactory explanation grounded on acceptable state policy."3 1 In
Swann, however, the deviations were "unjustified on the basis offered by
the State": 373 In other words, they could not "reasonably be said to ad-
vance a rational state policy. 374 In fact, no showing of a need to main-
tain political boundaries was made at all.rs If such a showing had been
made, it is possible that such deviations could have been tolerated, as the
larger deviation of 89% in the background of the Brown case was left
untouched.376
C. Constitutionality of the Proposal
The Court has yet to consider any case in which strong and valid pub-
lic policy reasons were demonstrated for malapportionment, but the
deviation was simply too large to justify. Thus, to determine if a devia-
tion of 26% is constitutionally permissible, one must return for guidance
to the seminal language in Reynolds. After acknowledging the impor-
tance of political boundaries, contiguity, compactness and history, the
367. Brown v. Thomson, 103 S. Ct. 2690, 2699 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
368. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971).
369. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 326, modified on other grounds, 411 U.S. 922
(1973).
370. See id. at 329.
371. 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
372. Id. at 444 (emphasis added).
373. Id. at 446.
374. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 328, modified on other grounds, 411 U.S. 922
(1973).
375. See Swann, 385 U.S. at 445; see also Cohen v. Maloney, 410 F. Supp. 1147, 1151
(D. Del. 1976) (holding that an 18% deviation among councilmanic districts is unaccept-
able). Although the defendant in Cohen asserted that the district lines preserved ethnic
homogeneity and followed the natural boundaries of a river, the court found no evidence
that such policies had ever before been articulated or used in any previous districting
effort. The policies thus failed to qualify as historical and even-handed policies applied in
all municipal districting efforts. See id. at 1153-54.
376. It must again be noted, however, that the Brown decision does not explicitly ap-
prove the 89% deviation; the question of overall malapportionment of Wyoming's legisla-
ture was not before the Court. See supra note 340.
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Court directed the states to make an "honest and good faith effort ' 377 to
achieve population equality. It then stated that
if, even as a result of a clearly rational state policy of according some
legislative representation to political subdivisions, population is sub-
merged as the controlling consideration in the apportionment of seats
in the particular legislative body, then the right of all of the State's
citizens to cast an effective and adequately weighted vote would be
unconstitutionally impaired.378
In other words, if the population deviation is the smallest that can
achieve legitimate state purposes, and if the effort to achieve equal vot-
ing strength remains paramount, then the deviation will probably be
allowed.
The present Board of Estimate cannot meet this test. If the policy to be
achieved is equal representation for each borough qua borough, then the
330% deviation (133% by modified calculations)3 79 is arguably the
smallest that can result when this goal is achieved. But this policy by its
very definition fails to keep population equality as the "controlling con-
sideration."380 If, on the other hand, the policy is to allow each borough
a single representative on the Board and thus to keep political boundaries
intact, then this is not the smallest deviation that will permit this goal to
be achieved. As was demonstrated earlier, a deviation of approximately
26% will result if Banzhafian weighted voting is used to give the larger
boroughs more votes on the Board.381 This would ensure equal voting
strength for all city residents, yet permit the Borough Presidents to con-
tinue in their roles as conduits of information, expertise and influence
between the boroughs and the City.
In light of the strong policy reasons for maintaining the Borough Pres-
ident seats on the Board, the 26% deviation certainly deserves constitu-
tional approval. Banzhafian weighted voting for the Board of Estimate
would permit periodic reapportionment of the weighted votes to reflect
the changing population of the City. It would maintain the presence of
each of the Borough Presidents as an advocate for his or her borough and
retain the flexibility of a small legislative body unhampered by subcom-
mittees and elaborate procedure. Finally, the Banzhafian model does not
reduce Staten Island to the "status of an observer";382 it merely reduces
Staten Island's voting power to an amount in proportion to its popula-
tion, as required by Reynolds and its progeny. 33 As the Second Circuit
stated when considering precisely this point, "the fact that a minority
may regularly be overshadowed by its more populous neighbors under a
377. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964).
378. Id. at 581.
379. See supra text accompanying notes 299-307.
380. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 581 (1964).
381. See supra Pt. VII.
382. Kramarsky Report, supra note 6, at 117 (commenting on the effect of weighted
voting for the Board), reprinted in Joint App., supra note 6, at 277.
383. See supra notes 320-43 and accompanying text.
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proportional voting scheme is one characteristic of a representative de-
mocracy." '384 In fact, the weighted voting scheme proposed in this article
provides "a constitutionally permissible way of blending majority control
with minority representation and other legitimate needs of local
government. 3 8
5
The alternatives to weighted voting are not easy to implement. Creat-
ing delegations to the Board from the large boroughs will destroy the
small size and resulting flexibility that has marked its history and been
cited as its strength.3 86 Specially elected "estimators" could substitute for
the Borough Presidents on the Board, but to avoid representational dis-
parities, such estimators would have to be elected city-wide. Although
residency requirements and borough-specific primaries could guarantee
one "favorite-son" estimator from each borough, city-wide elections
themselves create problems. First, the estimators would have to answer
to all the city residents when they seek election, possibly reducing their
effectiveness as representatives of their boroughs of residence. Second,
city-wide elections entail much higher costs than borough elections, mak-
ing it even more difficult for underfunded candidates to run. Third, city-
wide elections can dilute the vote of ethnic and racial minorities. As
minorities now have a substantial presence in Brooklyn, Manhattan, and
the Bronx, such a dilution could hinder their efforts to elect sympathetic
candidates to sit on the Board, and might run afoul of the Voting Rights
Act as amended in 1982.387 Further, such a plan removes the Borough
Presidents from the Board, their most powerful platform for lobbying on
behalf of their boroughs' interests. 38 8 Finally, it is possible that the Bor-
ough Presidents are better able than "estimators" to counteract executive
authority, because they have close ties to the county organizations of the
Democratic Party, with all their attendant political influence. 89
384. Morris v. Board of Estimate, 707 F.2d 686, 691 (2d Cir. 1983).
385. Id.
386. See Goodman Commission Report, supra note 107, at 84-86. See supra Pt. I.
387. See Voting Rights Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973b, 1973aa-la, 1973aa-6 (1982)). In 1980, Blacks, Hispan-
ics, Asians and other non-White groups comprised 43% of the New York City
population. Sovern Commission Report, supra note 32, at 433. Brooklyn had a 43% mi-
nority population, Manhattan a 50% minority population and the Bronx a 66% minority
population. Id. (percentages rounded off to the nearest point). By contrast, Queens had a
29% minority population and Staten Island a mere 11% minority population. Id. These
figures were developed by the author from census tract data supplied to the Justice De-
partment by the 1981 New York City Districting Commission. See id. at 431. The under-
lying data has some methodological flaws, and therefore this analysis was adapted to err
on the side of caution; thus, the minority population may be somewhat larger than these
figures would indicate. See id.
For a discussion of the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, see Sovern Com-
mission Report, supra note 32 at 463-79.
388. For a description of the Borough Presidents' power on the Board of Estimate, see
supra text accompanying notes 123-28.




If Borough Presidents were to appoint delegates to the Board in an
effort to escape the Hadley v. Junior College District390 "elected body"
trigger that subjects a body to one-person, one-vote requirements, then
the question reserved in Sailors v. Board of Education39 1-whether the
Constitution allows a legislative body to be appointed 392-- becomes rele-
vant. This not only opens up entirely new questions of constitutional law
that are certainly prone to further litigation, but it invites yet further
efforts toward the essentially fruitless search for a definition of a "legisla-
tive" body. If, in order to avoid such inquiries, the Board were to be
stripped of its clearly legislative budgetary powers, the result could be a
serious dislocation in city government, unless this change were accompa-
nied by a full scale reconsideration of the Charter and the structure of
New York City government.3 93 Certainly a new Charter Revision Com-
mission might conclude that the Board should be stripped of some or all
of its powers, with these functions to flow to the Mayor, the Council, the
boroughs, city agencies and community boards. However, this kind of
change should result from deliberation and a new philosophy of city gov-
ernment. If in fact the Constitution is not to be a "roadbloc[k] in the
path of innovation, experiment and development,"3 94 then Banzhafian
weighted voting offers an opportunity to provide independent representa-
tion to each borough, roughly equal weight to each citizen's vote, and the
preservation of an institution of government steeped in history, tradition
and necessity.
CONCLUSION
The structure of New York City government has been forged by the
pressures of party politics, geographic necessity and ethnic diversity. Its
390. 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970).
391. 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
392. See id. at 109-10.
393. Actually, the City Council Committee on Government Operations has recently
resurrected a bill to strip the Board of Estimate of its budgetary authority. See The Coun-
cil of the City of New York, A Local Law, Int. No. 282 (Dec. 14, 1982) (available in files
of Fordham Law Review). However, at the hearings held on May 2, 1984, the Committee
was warned that even without its budgetary powers, the Board may well exercise govern-
mental powers sufficient to subject it to one-person, one-vote requirements. In fact, strip-
ping the Board of such budgetary authority may well open the door to fresh litigation
over the quality of the remaining powers, subjecting city government to further years of
uncertainty. Nevertheless, Mayor Koch has said that he would consider stripping the
Board of its budgetary authority, if only to reduce the power of any Board reconstructed
to meet one-person, one-vote requirements. See Koch Plans Action if Estimate Board Suit
is Lost, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1984, at 43, col. 1. Such a new Board would necessarily
provide much less power for the Staten Island Borough President and would spur the
Staten Island secessionist movement. See Report says 'City' of Staten Island would meet
its bills, have a surplus, Staten Island Advance, June 20, 1983, at 1, col. 1. Reducing the
power of the Board might mollify the Staten Island leaders. A bill to create a state charter
revision commission for the City of New York was introduced in the State Assembly on
March 30, 1984. See Assembly Bill A.1251, 1985-86 Regular Sess. (Jan. 15, 1985).
394. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968).
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Board of Estimate is a rather unique structure, but the problems it faces
are common to local governments throughout the nation. The resolution
of the Board of Estimate litigation is likely to have an impact on other
municipalities, not only with respect to identifying the best mathematical
models of political power, but also with respect to defusing the tensions
between equal voting power for each citizen and the preservation of his-
torical, political, geographic, or ethnic constituencies.
This Article traces the history of the Board of Estimate, giving partic-
ular attention to power sharing between the central government and the
subordinate borough governments. In light of this background, it evalu-
ates the constitutionality of the Board's current formulation, and an al-
ternative formulation proposed by the author. It concludes that only
through this new formulation of voting power can the Board of Esti-
mate's balance of majority power and minority representation be pre-
served, while remaining within the confines of the one-person, one-vote
requirements of the fourteenth amendment. It is the author's hope that
these materials will be of use to charter revision efforts both in New York
City and in other cities around the country.

